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            This dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common 
value auction. Essay one examines the role of capacity constraint on the auction results and 
bidding behavior. We consider a general case where bidders are unconstrained, and a second 
setting where bidders are capacity constrained. We document downward sloping demand curves 
for individual bidders. Bidders shade their bids by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading 
their bids. The winner’s curse is strong in the unconstrained treatment, but we find no evidence 
of the winner’s curse when bidding constraints are imposed. Unconstrained bidders shade bids 
significantly more and their quantity-weighted prices are much lower than those in the 
constrained treatment. Interacting with the information structure, the capacity constraint has a 
significant impact on the auction results including the market clearing price, market efficiency, 
and the degree of market concentration. We provide evidence that efficient price discovery in 
multi-unit auctions with diverse information is possible, but careful attention to auction design 
will make this outcome more likely. Essay two examines how the introduction of a 
noncompetitive bidding option affects outcomes in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The 
experimental design incorporates many of the characteristics of the markets that pertain to the 
issuance of new equity securities. Important features of the bidding environment include 
endogenous bidder entry, costly information acquisition, bidders that differ by capacity 
constraint, and substantial uncertainty with respect to the intrinsic value. We use a standard 
uniform-price auction as our baseline setting where only competitive bids are accepted. Our 
results show that introducing the noncompetitive bidding option improves auction performance 
iv 
 
by increasing revenue and reducing price error. Underpricing is found in both treatments, but is 
less severe in the presence of the noncompetitive bidding option. The incorporation of this option 
significantly increases both the small bidder participation rate and allocation, and reduces the 
incentive for small bidders to free ride by submitting extremely high bids. Under both treatments, 
information acquisition increases large bidders’ profits but proves unprofitable for small bidders, 
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 This dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common 
value auction. Essay one examines the winner’s curse problem in a multi-unit common value 
setting. In our experimental markets we consider two settings under the uniform-price format.  In 
the first, each bidder is allowed to bid for the entire market supply. In the second, we add the 
realistic feature that bidders face bidding constraints that limit their potential demand to a 
fraction of market supply. Consistent with previous empirical study on the multi-unit auctions, 
we document the downward sloping demand curve for individual bidders. Bidders shade their 
bids in a multi-unit auction by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids. The 
winner’s curse is strong in the unconstrained treatment, but we find no evidence of the winner’s 
curse when bidding constraints are imposed. Interacting with the information structure, the 
capacity constraint has a significant impact on the auction results including the market clearing 
price, market efficiency, and the degree of market concentration. Essay two examines how to 
improve the performance of a traditional IPO auction through design modification. In the current 
IPO market, the traditional auction method is vulnerable to two major problems: the winner’s 
curse and the free riding problem, which deter the participation of the investors. To overcome 
these two problems, we introduce a noncompetitive bidding option. We use laboratory 
experiments to examine the impact of incorporating a noncompetitive bidding option on auction 
results and bidding behaviors. Our results show that introducing the noncompetitive bidding 
option improves auction performance by increasing revenue and reducing price error. Adding a 
noncompetitive bidding option reduces the magnitude of the winner’s curse. The incorporation 
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of this option significantly increases both the small bidder participation rate and allocation, and 




ESSAY 1: BIDDING CONSTRAINTS, THE WINNER’S CURSE, AND 
EFFICIENT PRICE DISCOVERY IN MULTI-UNIT COMMON VALUE 




 Auctions have a long history as an efficient mechanism for the pricing and allocation of 
Treasury securities. They are widely employed in the issuance of Treasury securities throughout 
the world and they are the dominant mechanism in countries with well-developed financial 
markets. A characteristic feature of these auctions is relatively little uncertainty with respect to 
intrinsic value, which is due to the frequent trading of the very similar securities in the active 
secondary markets at the time of Treasury issuance, thus diminishing the price discovery role of 
the auction. 
 In the financial asset auctions where there is significant uncertainty with respect to the 
intrinsic value, auctions have been much less widely used. For example, although auctions have 
also been used in equity IPOs in many countries, the dominant practice is the investment bank 
driven bookbuilding procedure. At present, a variant of an auction is only used in four countries, 




 Consistent and economically significant underpricing as an outcome of IPOs completed 
via bookbuilding has lead some researchers to conclude that the dominance of a suboptimal 
mechanism is maintained because of conflicts of interest between investment banks and issuers. 
                                                 
1 See Sherman (2005) for a review of global trends in IPO methods. 
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For example, Ausubel and Cramton (1998) write: “Indeed, the incumbent corporate underwriters 
possess a strong profit motive in discouraging the advent of auctions, as they are the 
beneficiaries of today's substantial underpricing.” They argue for the widespread use of carefully 
designed auctions. 
 Other research has focused on the superiority of the book-building process because of its 
facility in price discovery in a setting where potential investors would have little incentive to 
engage in costly information acquisition and truthfully reveal their preferences in an auction 
setting.
2
 In this literature auctions are criticized as producing inaccurate prices. 
 In this paper we investigate the accuracy of prices established in multi-unit common 
value auctions using an experimental economics methodology. A large experimental literature 
finds that the winner’s curse (pricing above intrinsic value) is the expected outcome in single-
unit common value auctions. These results are not necessarily applicable to multi-unit auctions 
however; recent work in the theory of multi-unit auctions shows that there exist non-cooperative 
equilibria under the uniform-price format (the most common type of auction in financial auctions) 
that support collusive-seeming outcomes.
3
 Moreover, in a multi-unit auction there is much more 
potential for bidders to learn from auction results since not only the highest bid on a single unit 
determines the market clearing price. Also, since bidders can be aggressive with only a portion 
of their demand curves, the potential for a bidder to mix speculative bids with conservative bids 
may have important implications for information aggregation and pricing accuracy. 
                                                 
2 The seminal paper in the large theoretical literature that examines the role of bookbuilding in solving the 
informational problem in new issues is Benveniste and Spindt (1989). 
3 See, for example, Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993), Ausubel and Cramton (1996) or Wang and Zender 
(2002) for theoretical results on strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions.   
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 In our experimental markets we consider two settings under the uniform-price format.  In 
the first, each bidder is allowed to bid for the entire market supply. In the second, we add the 
realistic feature that bidders face bidding constraints that limit their potential demand to a 
fraction of market supply.
4
 In these capacity constrained markets, we also increase the number of 
bidders in order to partially equalize potential demand across the settings. We hypothesize that 
bidding constraints will improve the accuracy of price discovery since the bidder with the highest 
signal will have less influence on the market clearing price. Questions we consider include the 
following. Does the winner’s curse arise in a multi-unit common value framework? Do capacity 
constraints play a role in affecting the possibility or magnitude of the winner’s curse? Do bidders 
behave differently when they are facing capacity constraints? How does the interaction of the 
information distribution and the capacity constraints affect the auction results? 
 Our main results are as follows. Consistent with previous empirical study on the multi-
unit auctions, we document the downward sloping demand curve for individual bidders. Bidders 
shade their bids in a multi-unit auction by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their 
bids. We find that the auction results differ in both treatments. The winner’s curse is strong in the 
unconstrained (UC) treatment, but we find no evidence of the winner’s curse when bidding 
constraints (C) are imposed. Bidders in the UC treatment shade bids significantly more than 
those in the C treatment; their quantity-weighted bid prices are much lower than those in the C 
treatment. Although on average bidders in the UC treatment bid more conservatively, they incur 
higher losses than those in the C treatment and the mean market clearing price is significantly 
                                                 
4 In field markets, this could be due to liquidity constraints or explicit rules imposed by the auctioneer. 
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higher in the UC treatment. The demand curves for the first 7 units of both treatments are very 
similar. Interacting with the information structure, the capacity constraint has a significant 
impact on the auction results including the market clearing price, market efficiency, and the 
degree of market concentration. We therefore provide evidence that efficient price discovery in 
multi-unit auctions with diverse information is possible, but careful attention to auction design 
will make this outcome more likely. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. In section II we discuss other relevant studies. In 
section III we explain the experimental design, in section IV we report our results, in session V 
we further discussion about our results, and in section VI we conclude. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 The winner’s curse arises in a single-unit common value auction with incomplete 
information.  In 1971, Capen, Clapp and Campbell coined the phrase “winner’s curse”, referring 
to the result of low rate of return for the companies who bid for the offshore oil drilling rights in 
the Gulf of Mexico. In the auction literature, the winner’s curse refers to either situation: 1) the 
winning bid exceeds the intrinsic value of the auctioned item such that the winner incurs a loss; 
or 2) the intrinsic value of the auctioned item is less than what the bidder anticipated, so the 
bidder may still have a net gain but will be worse off than anticipated. In a summarized work of 
the winner’s curse, Kagel and Levin (2002) state that economists, particularly theorists, refer to 
the winner’s curse as “the difference between the expected value of the item conditional on the 
event of winning and the naïve expectation (not conditional on the event of winning)”. The 
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existing literature measure the winner’s curse in several ways. In the first study of the winner’s 
curse, Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) use the average magnitude of overpayment, the 
difference between the actual value of the commodity and the average bid, to measure the degree 
and severity of the winner’s curse. In the later experimental studies by Kagel and Levin (1986), 
Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989), Lind and Plott (1991), the winner’s curse is measured by the 
deviation of the actual bid and risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bid function. These studies show 
that the phenomenon of the winner's curse in a single-unit auction is robust, even for experienced 
bidders. 
 With recent increasing research interest in the multi-unit auctions, Ausubel (2004) 
extends the definition of the winner’s curse in a single-unit auction setting to a multi-unit auction 
setting. He calls it “the champion’s plague”, or “winning more is bad news”. In his words, the 
winner’s curse is that “a bidder's expected value conditional on winning a larger quantity is less 
than her expected value conditional on winning a smaller quantity.” For auctions with uniform 
pricing rule, winning more is bad news only when the market clearing price is above the intrinsic 
value of the asset. If the market clearing price exceeds the intrinsic value, all the winning bidders 
will incur losses and the magnitude of each winner’s loss depends on the size of his allocation. 
Therefore, the degree of the winner’s curse under the uniform-pricing auctions can be simply 
measured by the overpayment, the difference of the market clearing price and the intrinsic value 
of the asset. We adopt this measurement in this paper. 
 Theoretical work on the divisible goods auction begins with Wilson (1979) who 
concludes that a share auction can yield significantly lower prices than a single-unit auction. 
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Back and Zender (1993) extend Wilson’s (1979) work by modeling the Treasury auction. Their 
study shows that collusive strategies are self-enforcing in uniform price, divisible goods auctions. 
Ausubel and Cramton (1996) show that demand reduction is part of equilibrium in uniform price 
auctions. Kyle (1989) studies the imperfect competition with insider information and shows that 
bidders have an incentive to reduce demand. Wang and Zender (2002) derive equilibrium bid 
schedules that contain both strategic considerations and explicit allowances for the winner's 
curse. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) study bidding behaviors under a uniform-pricing 
multi-unit auction where each bidder can bid 2 units. The model shows underbidding for the 
second unit is a Nash equilibrium.  
 Despite theoretical results of underpricing equilibrium, empirical studies of the Treasury 
auctions and IPO auctions show that the price discovery is efficient in uniform-pricing multi-unit 
auctions. Gordy(1999),  Bjønnes (2001), and Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002), 
Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2005) examine the Portuguese, Norwegian, Swedish, and 
Finnish Treasury auctions, respectively, and their results show little evidence of the winner’s 
curse, which may be due to the inherent features of the treasury auction – the less uncertainty 
about the intrinsic value due to the existence of the secondary market. The empirical studies of 
French IPO auctions (Derrien and Womack (2003)), and the U.S IPO auctions (Degeorge, 
Derrien, and Womack (2008)) suggest that auctioned IPOs could be an effective alternative to 
traditional bookbuilding due to less underpricing and lower price volatility. 
 The majority of the existing experimental study of the multi-unit auctions have focused 
on the independent private value (IPV) paradigm (see Alsemgeest, Noussair, and Olson (1998), 
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Kagel and Levin (2001, 2005), Ausubel (2004), List and Lucking-Reiley (2000), and 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, List, and Reiley (2006)). Sade, Schnitzlein, and Zender (2006a, 2006b) 
are the first two papers which investigate the bidding behaviors and auction results under a 
multi-unit common value setting. 
 This paper examines the role of one characteristic of the financial market - the capacity 
constraint on the bidding behaviors and auction results. In most of the auction literature, a 
common assumption is that bidders are able to bid for the entire market supply.  However, in the 
financial markets, bidders usually face liquidity constraints, and since concentrated holdings of 
financial assets are typically viewed as undesirable, bidding limits are typically built into auction 
procedures. For example, in the U.S. Treasury auctions, a single bidder is prohibited from 
acquiring more than 35% of a new issue. Another example is the Taiwan stock IPO auctions, 
where an investor is not allowed to buy more than 3% of the total shares available in an IPO 
auction.  
 The most related study of the implication of the capacity constraint in a multi-unit 
common value auction is Sade, Schnitzlein, and Zender (2006b), who find capacity constraints 
play an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in auctions 
with uniform pricing rule. Fang and Parreiras (2002) and Frutos and Pechlivanos (2006) also 
study how the capacity constraint affects the bidding behaviors in the common value setting but 
differs in many aspects. Fang and Parreiras (2002) focus on the second-price common value 
auctions with two financially constrained bidders who have affiliated signals and their results 
show that the likelihood that one’s opponent may be financially constrained increases the 
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possibility that a bidder wins the object, which attenuates the winners’ curse and makes a bidder 
more aggressive. Frutos and Pechlivanos (2006) show that the equilibrium bid functions are 
affected by the severity of financial constraints. Other studies of the role of the capacity 
constraints include McMillan (1994), Palfrey (1980), Pitchik and Schotter (1988), and Che and 
Gale (1996 and 1998). McMillan (1994) examines the role of the budget constraints in the FCC 
auctions. Palfrey (1980) studies the effects of budget constraints in a multi-unit discriminatory 
setting with complete information and demonstrates that a symmetric, pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium only exists in the two objects and two bidders case. Pitchik and Schotter (1988) find 
that bidders can exploit the budget constraint of others by bidding up the price of the good 
offered early in sequential auctions. Che and Gale (1996 and 1998) study single-unit independent 
private value (IPV) auctions with budget constraints and show that even with symmetric bidders, 
revenue equivalence no longer holds once financial constraints are imposed.  
 
1.3 Experiment Design and procedure 
1.3.1 Experimental Design Overview 
 Each experiment session consists of a series of auction periods in which multiple bidders 
engage in bidding for 20 homogenous goods we call widgets in a uniform-pricing common value 
auction. In most of existing multi-unit auction models, price and quantity are assumed to be 
continuous. As in field markets and experimental studies, we let price, quantity, and bids to be 
discrete. Auction rules, information structure, and distributions of random variables are held 
constant so that we can compare the impact of the treatment on price discovery. 
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 Auctions are conducted under two treatments. Table 1 Panel A displays the treatment 
conditions. In the unconstrained (UC) treatment, 4 bidders compete together and each bidder can 
bid for up to the total supply of the goods. This setting corresponds to the common assumption 
that bidders are not financially constrained or no explicit bidding limits are imposed, and 
therefore provides a benchmark case for study. In the constrained (C) setting, each bidder can bid 
for up to 7 widgets. The bidding constraint differentiates the UC vs. C treatments. Since 
competition increases with market demand and the number of bidders, the competition in a 
constrained setting may decrease unless the number of bidders in the constrained setting is 
greater than the number of bidders in the unconstrained setting. Therefore, in the constrained 
treatment we increase the number of bidders to 6 in order to compensate for the possible 
decreased competition from less market demand and partially equalize the potential competition 
across the settings. In both treatments, bidding capacity is common knowledge. To control for 
possible behavioral differences, each bidder in the same treatment faces the same bidding 
capacity.  
 We follow Kagel and Levin’s (1986) experiment design to set the parameters. The true 
value V  is randomly selected from a uniform distribution on the interval [VL, VH]. V is 
unknown to the bidders before each auction, and is revealed to the bidders when the auction is 
completed. Before each auction starts, bidder i receives a private signal iS  about the true value 
of the widget. Each signal is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support [𝑉 +
𝜀,𝑉 − 𝜀]. The information structure across bidders is symmetric. Given VL, VH, Si , and ε, the 
range of V can be inferred, which is [max{ 𝑉 − 𝜀, VL }, min{ 𝑉 + 𝜀, VH }]. Kagel and Levin 
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(1986) manipulate the value of ε to test how the uncertainty about the intrinsic value affects the 
degree of the winner’s curse. In our experiment, we control the uncertainty level by holding ε 
constant. 
 Each bidder competes by submitting discrete bid schedules. Once all schedules have been 
submitted, the computer will assign widgets to bidders submitting the highest bids until up to 20 
widgets are allocated. According to the uniform-pricing rule, all the winning bidders pay the 
same market clearing price for each widget he is allocated. The profit or loss for each auction is 
calculated as follows: Profit/loss = Number of Widgets Allocated   (True Value – Market 
Clearing Price). The profit (loss) is carried over from auction to auction.  
1.3.2 Parameter Values and Variable Distributions 
 In our experiment, the monetary unit employed is the laboratory dollar (L$). To convert 
laboratory dollars to US$s, the exchange rate is 0.05. Each bidder starts with the same initial 
cash balance of L$400. The reason for imposing an initial cash balance is to avoid control issues 
associated with bankruptcy.  
 Table 1 Panel B shows information structure. The true value (V) is randomly drawn from 
the uniform distribution with mean of L$50 and support on the whole laboratory dollars between 
L$14 and L$86, inclusively. The true value varies auction by auction.   is equal to 4. The 
private information signal is selected randomly from an integer interval range of [V-4, V+4]. 
Since we employ different numbers of bidders in the two settings and to minimize the 
information differences between the two settings, we let the first 4 bidders in C treatment receive 
the same information as those 4 bidders in the UC treatment. All information pertaining to 
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endowment, payments, true value, signal distribution, and the rules governing auction is common 
knowledge. 
1.3.3 Communication and Computer Displays 
 The auctions are conducted on networked personal computers with custom designed 
software. In addition to allowing the entry of bids, the software graphed individual demand 
curves in real time as each subject initiated the bid submission process. The aggregate demand 
schedule, market clearing price, and allocations for each auction are calculated by the software at 
the completion of each auction. After each auction, each bidder is provided with information 
about the market clearing price, allocation, the true value, and his profit or loss. In addition, the 
interface provided historical information pertaining to each subject’s previously submitted 
demand functions matched with their allocations, profit, and percentage of available supply 
received for each completed auction. Over the course of experiment, subjects are not allowed to 
communicate with each other. 
1.3.4 Subjects and Procedures 
 We conducted a total of 15 sessions, with 7 sessions for the C treatment and 8 sessions 
for the UC treatment. Each session consisted of 14 auctions in both treatments. Each 
experimental session consisted of 4 subjects in the UC treatment or 6 subjects in the C treatment. 
These 4 subjects or 6 subjects bid together. We recruited graduate and undergraduate students 
from the University of Central Florida in May, June, and November of 2008 and June 2009. The 
majority of them were undergraduates in the College of Business Administration.  They were 
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allowed to participate in only one session. None of them had previous experience in auction 
experiments. This randomization enables us to control for learning and experience effect.  
 At the beginning of each session, subjects were given written instructions. The 
instructions explained the auction rules, the basis on which cash payments would be made, and 
included graphical displays that introduce the subjects to the software used to conduct the 
experiment. The experimenter read the instructions to the subjects, and subjects were then given 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
 Then, each subject was assigned to one computer terminal. They competed through 
submitting bid schedules. The schedule indicates the number of widgets the bidder is willing to 
buy at a given price. Once all schedules have been submitted, the computer will assign widgets 
to bidders submitting the highest bids until up to the available supply of 20 widgets is exhausted. 
All the winning bidders will pay the same price (market clearing price) for each widget he is 
allocated. There were 14 auctions in each session. After an auction is completed, the computer 
moves on to a new auction. This auction is totally independent from the previous auction.   
 
1.4 Experimental Results 
            We examine the experimental results in the following aspects: basic bidding results, the 
profits, bidding strategies, market clearing price, and allocations. 
1.4.1 Basic Statistics 
 Table 2 presents basic statistics about auction results for both treatments. The difference 
of the market clearing price and the true value measures the degree of overpricing, which not 
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only proxy for the degree of the winner’s curse but also proxy for pricing inaccuracy. We find 
that market clearing prices generated in both treatments differ significantly. On average, the 
market clearing price in the UC treatment is L$0.83 above the true value, which is significantly 
different from zero. However, in the C treatment, the market clearing price is L$0.24 below the 
true value, though the difference is not statistically significant different from zero. This result 
indicates that the constrained setting promotes more accurate pricing than the unconstrained 
setting does. The winner’s curse is alive in the UC treatment since each winner will overpay 
L$0.83 for each unit of his allocation. For the winners in the C treatment, the unit price paid by 
them is even lower than the true value and therefore they actually made profits.  
 The magnitude of differential in both revenue and bidder profit differential across 
treatments is significant. On average, the UC treatment generates L$21.51 more revenue than the 
C treatment, which is due to the higher market clearing price in the UC treatment. The last two 
columns of Table 2 show bidder’s average profit. The average constrained bidder received a 
positive profit of L$11.43 per session while the average unconstrained bidder incurs a loss of 
L$59.38 per session, which is a loss of L$4.24 per auction. And the loss is statistically 
significantly different from zero.  
1.4.2 Profits 
 Table 3 reports winners’ profits and auction distribution data. On average, bidders in the 
C treatment are more likely to be winners than in the UC treatment. The proportion of the 
winners in the C treatment is 79% while 67% in the UC treatment. We define a winner as a 
bidder whose allocation is nonzero. For session n (n=1, 2 …, 7 for C treatment and n=1, 2 …, 8 
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p  ( ljnp ,, is winner l’s profit in auction j of session n; jnm , is the number 
of winners in auction j (j=1, 2 …, 14,) of session n, and l=1,2,…, jm .) Column 6 in Table 3 
reports the mean winner’s auction profit by session. Each winner in the UC treatment incurs an 
average loss of L$9.52 per auction, which is significantly greater than zero. However, the 
average winner in the C treatment earns a positive profit of L$0.83 per auction, though the size 
of the profit is not significantly different from zero. These results indicate that the winner’s curse 
is very strong in the unconstrained setting but we do not find the evidence of the winner’s curse 
in the constrained setting. Table 3 also reports the auction distribution based on the winner’s loss 
or gain. The proportion of auctions with positive winner’s profit is 32% in the UC treatment and 
42% in the C treatment. The difference is not significant. However, the winners incur a loss in 
only 22% of the auctions in the C treatment and the number greatly falls below in the UC 
treatment, which is 53%. These data further support the claim that the winner’s curse is alive and 
significant in the unconstrained setting.  
1.4.3 Bidding Strategies 
 In a multi-unit auction, bidders face a much larger bidding strategy space than in a signal-
unit auction. Submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids are possible strategies they 
can implement. We first examine whether bidders submit price-quantity pairs. Later we will 
examine whether and how bidders spread their bids. Figure 1 shows the percentage of auctions 
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under each treatment in which a given number of bidders submitted more than one price-quantity 
pairs. In the UC treatment, auctions with all four bidders submitting multiple price-quantity pairs 
occur in 73% of the auctions. In the C treatment, all six bidders submitted multiple price-quantity 
pairs as bids in 67% of the auctions. In the UC treatment, three bidders submitted price-quantity 
pairs in 23% of all auctions and only two bidders submitted price-quantity pairs in 4% of the 
auctions. In the C treatment, five bidders submitted price-quantity pairs in 26% of the auctions 
and only four bidders submitted price-quantity pairs in 7% of the auctions. In all auctions, 
bidders use price-quantity pairs. The result is consistent with the experimental result of Sade, 
Schnitzlein, and Zender (2006b). Their study shows bidders use price-quantity pairs as a bidding 
strategy in a divisible good auction. We also find that unconstrained bidders bid at a greater 
number of prices than those in the constrained setting. On average, each bidder in the UC 
treatment submitted 4.54 bids per auction, which is higher than the 3.68 bids in the C treatment. 
 Now, we study whether and how bidders spread their bids. We adopt the moment 
analysis by Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2005). The quantity-weighted bid price (the first 
moment), standard deviation (the second moment), skewness (the third moment), and kurtosis 
(the fourth moment) are shown in Table 4. We keep the notation used by Keloharju, Nyborg, and 




represents the demand schedule submitted by bidder i in auction j, 
where m is the number of bids bidder i submitted. ijp is the quantity-weighted average bid price 

















evaluate the bid shading relative to the market clearing price, we calculate the discount d. In 
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auction j for bidder i, the discount d is measured by the difference of the market clearing price, 
jP , and bidder i’s quantity-weighted bid price, ijp . The formula for discount is ijjij pPd  . The 
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis for demand schedule of bid i in auction j are 


















































 To simplify the study, we normalize the bidding data by two methods: (1) setting the true 
value in each auction to zero; (2) setting each bidder’s signal to zero. The first method enables us 
to measure how bidders behave relative to the true value. The second method helps us to 
examine how bidders behave relative to their private signals. Due to the normalization process, 
bid prices can be positive, negative, or zero. Table 4 Panel A shows the moments of individual 
demand curves when the true value is normalized to zero. Bidders in both treatments shade their 
bids. On average, the discount for constrained bidder is L$0.37, which is economically small and 
not statistically different from zero. In the UC treatment, each bidder’s bid price is L$1.46 below 
the true value, which is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. We can conclude 
that unconstrained bidders shade their bids significantly more than constrained bidders. Bidders 
also submit their bids below their signals. Table 4 Panel B reports the moment statistics when 
each bidder’s signal is normalized to zero. The discount here is measured by the difference of the 
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quantity-weighted bid price and the private signal. Since each bidder’s signal is normalized to 
zero, the discount directly measures the degree of bid shading relative to the private signal. 
Bidders in the UC treatment bid significantly below their signals than those in the C treatment. 
On average, a constrained bidder’s quantity-weighted bid price is L$0.35 below his signal while 
an unconstrained bidder’s bid price is L$1.43 below his signal. This bidding behavior is 
consistent with empirical findings in the study of Gordy(1999),  Bjønnes (2001), and Nyborg, 
Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002).  
 The skewness and Kurtosis show some features of bid distribution. More positive 
skewness is observed in the UC treatment than in the C treatment, indicating that for a bidder in 
the UC treatment, a large portion of his bids are lower than but close to the mean quantity-
weighted bid price and a small portion of high bids are located away from the mean. A bidder in 
the UC treatment submits some bids at very high prices but most bids are at lower prices than the 
mean quantity-weighted price. The Kurtosis of the bid distribution in the UC treatment is higher, 
also indicating unconstrained bidders submit more extreme bids than constrained bidders. 
 One important aspect of bidding behavior is bidding aggressiveness. We next examine 
whether bidding aggressiveness differs in the UC and C treatments. We use the quantity-
weighted price to proxy for bidding aggressiveness. Simply comparing the mean, we find that on 
average constrained bidders bid more aggressively than unconstrained bidders, since the average 
quantity-weighted price for constrained bidder (-L$0.37) is significantly higher than that for 
unconstrained bidders (-L$1.46). We also run a regression to test the impact of the treatment on 
the bid price. The dependent variable is bidder i’s mean quantity-weighted bid price. The number 
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of observations for the UC treatment is 32 and 42 for the C treatment. Constrained is a dummy 
variable with 1 for C treatment and 0 for UC treatment. We also include Average Signal which is 
the mean of the signals that one bidder received in one session. The regression equation is  
Quantity-weighted Bid Price = 0 + 1 Constrained + 2 Average Signal +   
 The regression result is displayed in Table 5. The estimated coefficient for the variable 
Constrained is 1.06 and significantly differently from zero, indicating that bidders in the C 
treatment bid more aggressively than those in the UC treatment. The coefficient for the variable 
Average Signal is not significantly different from zero and we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the mean signal has no effect on the quantity-weighted bid price. Additional evidence of 
more aggressiveness in the C treatment is that constrained bidders bid very close to their 
information signals while unconstrained bidders bid much below their signals. We conclude that 
constrained bidders bid more aggressively than unconstrained bidders. 
 In the UC treatment, the first 7 units are more likely to be allocated than the “tail” of the 
demand schedule. The “tail” of the demand schedule, which has little chance to be allocated, 
impacts on the moment statistics of the individual bidder’s demand schedule. Following Sade, 
Schnitzlein, and Zender (2006b), we compare the individual demand schedules which are only 
composed of the first 7 units. In Table 4, UC (7) represents the demand schedule for the first 7 
units under the UC mechanism. The data reflects no significant difference between the moments 
of demand schedules of UC (7) and C (7). The bidding behavior for submitting the first 7 units in 
both settings are similar.  Figure 2 graphs the individual demand curves for UC (20 units), UC (7 
units), and C (7 units). The demand schedules of UC (7) and C (7) almost coincide and the slope 
21 
 
for UC (7 units) is -3.30 and the slope for C (7 units) is -3.48. However, the slope of the demand 
curve containing all 20 units in the UC treatment (-1.24) is much flatter, indicating that the 
demand in the UC treatment is less sensitive to the price change. Since there is no behavioral 
difference in submitting the first 7 units for constrained and unconstrained bidders, the large 
discount and the flat demand curve for the UC treatment appears to be due to the impact of the 
“tail”. The “tail” pulls down the quantity-weighted price and therefore pushes up the discount. 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of bids at the bidder level. We also observe that UC (20 units) 
has more bids below true value zero than UC (7 units) and C (7 units), which is further evidence 
of the impact of the “tail.”  
1.4.4 Market Clearing Prices and Profit 
 In this section, we compare market clearing prices and bidder’s profit between the two 
treatments. Mean market clearing prices and profit by both session and auction are reported in 
Table 2. Figure 4 shows the distribution of auctions by the market clearing price. Figure 5 shows 
the distribution of auctions by the relationship between the market clearing price and the true 
value. Figure 6 displays the distribution of bidders by session profit or loss. Figure 7 examines 
how profit evolves with experience over the 14 auctions. 
 Table 2 reports the mean market clearing price. The market clearing price in the UC 
treatment is significantly lower than in the C treatment. Figure 4 shows the distribution of 
auctions by the market clearing price. We can find that more auctions in the C treatment with 
market clearing prices below true value than in the UC treatment. Figure 5 displays the 
distribution of auctions by the relationship between the market clearing price and the true value. 
22 
 
In all 112 auctions of the UC treatment, 53% of the auctions saw market clearing prices higher 
than the true value. In the C treatment, only 26% of the auctions have the market clearing price 
higher than the true value. There are more auctions in the C treatment than in the UC treatment 
where the market clearing price is exactly the same as the true value, indicating the C mechanism 
results in more efficient price discovery than the UC mechanism. Under a uniform-pricing 
auction, the level of the market clearing price directly determines a bidder’s profit. Figure 6 
shows the distribution of bidders by session profit or loss. The figure shows bidders are more 
likely to incur losses in the UC treatment than in the C treatment. 66% of the bidders incur losses 
in the UC treatment while only 29% of the bidders incur losses in the C treatment. 
 The market clearing price is noticeably different in the treatments. In order to assess the 
impact of the capacity constraint on the market clearing price, we pool the data from all 210 
auctions and estimate the following regression equation:  
Market Clearing Price= 0 + 1 Constrained+ 2 Average Signal+ 3 Experienced +   
 In this equation, Constrained is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for the C 
treatment and 0 for the UC treatment. The estimated coefficient for Constrained represents the 
difference of the effect of the capacity constraint on the market clearing price. Average Signal is 
a variable that indicates the signal level in a particular auction and is calculated by averaging the 
4 signals in auctions under the UC treatment and 6 signals in auctions under the C treatment.  
Experienced is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 for auction 1 to 7, and 1 for auction 8 
to 14. It estimates the effect of a bidder’s experience on the market clearing price. The null 
hypotheses are 0321   . 
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 The regression result is reported in Table 5. The estimated coefficient for 1  indicates 
that the market clearing price in the C treatment is L$1.15 lower than in the UC treatment. The 
estimated 1  is statistically significant at the 5% level, implying that the capacity constraint 
reduces the market clearing price significantly. The market clearing price is positively related to 
the average signal level. The estimated 3  is insignificant and close to zero in magnitude. 
Therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis that bidder’s bidding experience has no effect on 
the market clearing price. Since the bidder’s profit is directly related to the level of market 
clearing price, we can infer that bidder’s experience has no effect on his profit. We test this by 
examining how profit evolves with experience over 14 auctions. The result confirms that no 
relationship exists between the bidding experience and the profit. Figure 7 shows the evolution 
of bidder’s profit. The first point represents the mean profit for all 14 auctions. The second point 
is the mean profit for auction 2 through 14, and so on. There is no monotonically increasing or 
decreasing trend for both curves, indicating experience does not affect profit.  
1.4.5 Allocation 
 Figure 8 reports the auction distribution by the number of winners for both treatments. 94% 
of auctions in the constrained setting allocate widgets to more than half of the bidders (3 bidders). 
However, in the UC treatment, only 60% of auctions allocate widgets to more than half of the 
bidders (2 bidders). The allocation pattern differs. Bidders in the C treatment are more likely to 
become winners.  
 We further examine the allocation pattern by evaluating the allocation asymmetry. We 
use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HH index) to measure the award concentration. The HH 
24 
 
index is calculated by summing the squares of the percentage allocations across the bidders in a 
given auction.  The HH index ranges from 1/N to 1, where N is the number of bidders. The HH 
index equals one when all the units are allocated to one bidder. High HH index indicates high 











H , where iq is the quantity of the units awarded to bidder i , Q  is the total number 
of the goods available for sale, and N is the number of bidders in one auction. In our experiment, 
a HH index of 0.25 for the UC treatment means perfectly symmetric allocation of 5 units per 
bidder. For the C treatment, a perfectly symmetric allocation of 3.3 ( 3.3
6
20
 ) units reflects a 
HH index of 0.17. Table 6 Panel A shows that the average HH index in the UC treatment (0.57) 
is significantly higher than 0.25, suggesting an asymmetric allocation pattern. The mean HH 
index in the C treatment is 0.27, which is also significantly higher than 0.17. Therefore, an 
asymmetric inter-bidder allocation exists in both settings. We go further to investigate which 
mechanism produces more asymmetric allocation by looking at the normalized HH index. The 











  and ranges from 0 to 1. Table 6 Panel B 
shows that the mean *H for the UC treatment (0.42) is significantly higher than that in the C 
treatment (0.12). The reason lies in that bidders have higher market power in the C treatment 
than in the UC setting. One unconstrained bidder can take the whole market while at least three 
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constrained bidders are needed to take the whole market. Capacity constraint directly impacts the 
allocation pattern and influencing the degree of market power.  
 
1.5 Discussion 
 Although bidders in both treatments shade bids, constrained bidders bid more 
aggressively than unconstrained bidders. The average quantity-weighted bid price for a 
constrained bidder is -L$0.37 while -L$1.46 for an unconstrained bidder. Despite this, the mean 
market clearing price in the C treatment (-L$0.24) is statistically lower than that in the UC 
treatment (L$0.83). This is due to the effect of capacity constraint. 
 We compare the mean market clearing price and the bidder’s quantity-weighted bid price 
for both treatments. We find that the constrained bidder’s bid price (-L$0.37) is not significantly 
different from the mean market clearing price (-L$0.19) but the unconstrained bidder’s bid price 
(-L$1.46) is significantly lower than the mean market clearing price (L$0.83). Therefore, an 
interesting question arises: How do we reconcile the more aggressive bidding in the C treatment 
with the lower market clearing price? In the previous analysis, we show that the constrained 
bidder’s quantity-weighted bid price is lower than the unconstrained bidder’s quantity-weighted 
bid price due to the impact of the “tail” of the demand curve. By studying the first 7 units of 
individual demand curves, we find no difference in the slopes of both demand curves and the 
average quantity-weighted bid prices. This indicates that bidders in both mechanisms have 
similar strategies over the first 7 units. The left 13 units located at the tail of the demand 
schedule actually play a role of pulling down the quantity-weighted bid price. This explains why 
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the average quantity-weighed bid price for UC (20) is lower than C (7).  The market clearing 
price in the C treatment is lower than that in the UC treatment due to the interaction of 
information structure and capacity constraint. Table 7 shows the relationship between the market 
clearing price and the quantity-weighted bid price. For each auction, we rank bidders’ quantity-
weighted bid prices from the highest to the lowest. We then compare the averaged quantity-
weighted bid price in a specified rank with the market clearing price. For example, on average, 
the highest quantity-weighted bid price in the UC treatment is L$1.48, which is significantly 
different from the market clearing price L$0.83.  Interestingly, the quantity-weighted bid price in 
each rank is very different from the market clearing price. We then examine the location of the 
market clearing price relative to bidders’ quantity-weighted prices. The position of the market 
clearing price for the UC treatment is between the highest and 2
nd
 highest bid price. The market 




 highest bid price. This indicates 
that the interaction of information structure and capacity constraint plays a critical role in 
influencing the market clearing price. In the UC treatment, a bidder has more market power and 
can take the whole market while it requires at least three bidders to take the whole market in the 
C treatment. A uniform-pricing rule indicates that the highest bid price in the UC treatment and 
the 3
rd
 highest bid price in the C treatment are more likely to become market clearing prices. Due 
to the bid shading behavior, the market clearing price is lower than the highest bid price in the 
UC treatment and the 3
rd




 This paper examines bidding behavior and price discovery in a multi-unit auction. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions and previous empirical studies on multi-unit auctions, our 
experiment documents downward-sloping demand curves for individual bidders. Bidders employ 
mixed strategies and shade their bids by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids. 
However, we find that the auction outcomes differ in both settings. The winner’s curse is strong 
in the unconstrained setting but we find no evidence of the winner’s curse in the capacity 
constrained setting. At the auction level, in the unconstrained setting, the average bidder incurs a 
loss of L$4.24, but winners lose an average of L$9.52. In the constrained setting, the average 
bidder makes a profit of L$0.82, but winners make an average profit of L$0.83. Winning is bad 
news for winners in the unconstrained setting. Unconstrained bidders shade bids significantly 
more and their quantity-weighted prices are much lower than those in the constrained treatment. 
By studying the individual demand schedules, we find that the demand curves for the first 7 units 
of both constrained and unconstrained treatments are very similar. The tail of the demand curve 
in the unconstrained treatment significantly reduces the quantity-weighted bid price. Although 
unconstrained bidders submit bids more conservatively, they incur higher losses than constrained 
bidders, and the mean market clearing price is significantly higher than in the constrained 
treatment. Using the difference of the mean market clearing price and the true value to proxy for 
pricing accuracy, we find that the constrained treatment produces more efficient price discovery. 
A significant difference in the auction results in the constrained versus unconstrained setting 
indicates that the capacity constraint plays a critical role in determining bidding behavior and 
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improving the accuracy of price discovery. Reducing the influence of a single bidder on the 
market clearing price significantly improves information aggregation, and the overall 
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Table 1: Experimental design 
Panel A. Treatment conditions 
   





C (Constrained) Uniform price 6 14 No L$ 400 0.05 20 7 
UC (Unconstrained) Uniform price 4 14 No L$ 400 0.05 20 20 
 
Panel B. Information structure 
Auction #   A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
 True value   82 39 51 49 51 62 70 19 49 81 60 71 57 82 34 
 Treatment Bidder ID Signals   
 UC B1 80 40 53 49 50 61 67 16 50 77 61 75 57 81 30 
 UC B2 84 43 51 48 53 65 71 23 45 79 64 67 57 79 34 
 UC B3 78 43 55 45 49 62 69 21 45 84 61 75 58 85 32 
 UC B4 81 37 48 50 47 58 68 20 46 82 57 75 61 81 32 
   Mean 80.75 40.75 51.75 48.00 49.75 61.50 68.75 20.00 46.50 80.50 60.75 73.00 58.25 81.50 32.00 
   std 2.50 2.87 2.99 2.16 2.50 2.89 1.71 2.94 2.38 3.11 2.87 4.00 1.89 2.52 1.63 
                   C B1 80 40 53 49 50 61 67 16 50 77 61 75 57 81 30 
 C B2 84 43 51 48 53 65 71 23 45 79 64 67 57 79 34 
 C B3 78 43 55 45 49 62 69 21 45 84 61 75 58 85 32 
 C B4 81 37 48 50 47 58 68 20 46 82 57 75 61 81 32 
 C B5 83 38 48 53 48 64 74 22 51 81 61 67 58 78 30 
 C B6 86 37 47 50 53 62 71 23 48 82 59 71 55 79 36 
   Mean 82.00 39.67 50.33 49.17 50.00 62.00 70.00 20.83 47.50 80.83 60.50 71.67 57.67 80.50 32.33 
   std 2.90 2.80 3.20 2.64 2.53 2.45 2.53 2.64 2.59 2.48 2.35 3.93 1.97 2.51 2.34 
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Table 2: Experimental sessions and summary statistics  
The nonparametric test is two-sample Fisher-Pitman permutation test for equality of means. The p-value is two-tailed p-value. 





Mean clearing price 




Auction Session Auction Session 
05/29/08 1 C 6 14 -0.43 1167.14 16340 1.43 20.0 
05/30/08 2 C 6 14 -0.29 1170.00 16380 0.95 13.3 
06/02/08 3 C 6 14 0.21 1180.00 16520 -0.71 -10.0 
06/03/08 4 C 6 14 -0.07 1174.29 16440 0.24 3.3 
06/04/08 5 C 6 14 0.21 1180.00 16520 -0.71 -10.0 
11/19/08 6 C 6 14 -0.79 1160.00 16240 2.62 36.7 
06/10/09 7 C 6 14 -0.57 1164.29 16300 1.90 26.7 
Mean         -0.24 1170.82 16391.43 0.82 11.43 
t-stat         -1.7040 402.9929 402.9929 1.6905 1.6905 
          05/29/08 1 UC 4 14 0.71 1190.00 16660 -3.57 -50.0 
05/30/08 2 UC 4 14 -0.21 1171.43 16400 1.07 15.0 
06/03/08 3 UC 4 14 0.00 1175.71 16460 0.00 0.0 
06/05/08 4 UC 4 14 0.57 1187.14 16620 -2.86 -40.0 
06/06/08 5 UC 4 14 2.00 1215.71 17020 -10.71 -150.0 
11/17/08 6 UC 4 14 0.57 1187.14 16620 -2.86 -40.0 
06/12/09 7 UC 4 14 1.71 1210.00 16940 -8.57 -120.0 
06/12/09 8 UC 4 14 1.29 1201.43 16820 -6.43 -90.0 
Mean         0.83 1192.32 16692.50 -4.24 -59.38 
t-stat         3.0040 215.5172 215.5172 -2.9489 -2.9476 
          Difference         -1.08 -21.51 -301.07 5.06 70.80 
t-stat  
    
3.4414 3.4414 3.4414 -3.3314 3.3300 




Table 3: Profits and bidding for bidders and winners 
The winner is defined as the bidder who is allocated with nonzero units of widgets. For each session, the winner's profit by auction is calculated by first 
averaging all the winners' profits in each auction to obtain the average winner's auction profit, and then averaging the mean winner's auction profit for the 14 
auctions. The nonparametric test is two-sample Fisher-Pitman permutation test for equality of means. The p-value is two-tailed p-value. 
Session # of auctions 
# of winners 
in auction 
% of winners 
 (# of winners/# 
of bidders) 




% of auctions with 
winner's loss 
 (# of auctions 
with winner's 
loss/total # of 
auctions) 
% of auctions with 
winner's positive 
proift 
 (# of auctions with 
winner's positive 
profit/total # of 
auctions) 
% of auctions with 
winner's zero profit 
 (# of auctions with 
winner's zero 
profit/total # of 
auctions) 
UC1 14 2.4 0.61 -3.57 -11.07 7 50% 6 43% 1 7% 
UC2  14 2.3 0.57 1.07 1.90 4 29% 7 50% 3 21% 
UC3 14 3.1 0.79 0.00 -1.07 5 36% 6 43% 3 21% 
UC4 14 2.4 0.59 -2.86 -10.83 7 50% 6 43% 1 7% 
UC5 14 2.6 0.64 -10.71 -24.64 9 64% 2 14% 3 21% 
UC6 14 3.2 0.80 -2.86 -3.93 8 57% 5 36% 1 7% 
UC7 14 2.8 0.70 -8.57 -14.52 10 71% 1 7% 3 21% 
UC8 14 2.5 0.63 -6.43 -12.02 9 64% 3 21% 2 14% 
Mean 
 
2.66 0.67 -4.24 -9.52 7.4 53% 4.5 32% 2.1 15% 
C1 14 4.9 0.81 1.4 1.64 2 14% 5 36% 7 50% 
C2 14 4.6 0.76 1.0 0.62 4 29% 7 50% 3 21% 
C3 14 4.5 0.75 -0.7 -1.55 4 29% 3 21% 7 50% 
C4 14 4.8 0.80 0.2 0.52 3 21% 6 43% 5 36% 
C5 14 4.6 0.76 -0.7 -0.71 7 50% 4 29% 3 21% 
C6 14 5.3 0.88 2.6 2.95 1 7% 8 57% 5 36% 
C7 14 4.6 0.77 1.9 2.36 4 7% 9 57% 1 7% 
Mean 
 
4.74 0.79 0.82 0.83 3.6 22% 6.0 42% 4.4 32% 
Difference     -0.13 -5.06 -10.36   0.30   -0.10   -0.16 
t-stat 
  







Nonparametric test (p-value) 0.0075 0.0056 0.0067   0.0044   0.2017   0.0202 
 




Table 4: Moments analysis 
 
Panel A contains results on moment analysis when the true asset value is normalized to zero. Panel B contains results on moments analysis 
when the signal is normalized to zero. UC(20) represents the UC treatment where each bidder can bid up to 20 units. C(7) stands for the C 
treatment where each bidder can bid up to 7 units. UC(7) stands for the UC treatment where only the first 7 units submitted by bidder are 
studied. The analysis is at bidder level. The moments data (quantity demanded, number of bids, bid price, discount, standard deviation, 
skewness, and kurtosis) in the sheet is obtained by first calculating the moments data for each bidder in each auction, then getting auction 
mean for each bidder, finally averaging all the bidders' moments data. Each bidder is an observation. N=32 for UC treatment and N=42 for 
C treatment). The parenthesis is the t-statistic. 
          Panel A. The true value is normalized to zero.             
  Q demanded # of bids 
bid 
price 
discount STD Skewness Kurtosis signal bid price - signal 
UC(20) 18.45 4.54 -1.46 1.46 1.58 0.47 2.43 -0.09 -1.38 
  
14.7283 -6.1162 6.1162 12.9701 5.6337 15.5670 -0.8700 -5.4329 
          
UC(7) 6.91 2.67 0.16 -0.16 0.96 -0.09 1.97 -0.09 0.23 
  
14.7197 0.5039 -0.5039 9.2115 -1.0313 35.5698 -0.8653 0.6936 
          
C(7) 6.94 3.68 -0.37 0.37 1.59 0.09 1.99 -0.02 -0.35 
    24.8022 -1.7039 1.7039 10.3779 1.7413 33.1711 -0.3162 -1.7096 
          
UC(7)-C(7) 
 
-1.01 0.53 -0.53 -0.63 -0.18 -0.02 -0.07 0.59 
  
-4.3064 1.3933 -1.3933 -3.3955 -1.7623 -0.2999 -0.5126 1.4827 
          
UC(20)-C(7) 
 
0.86 -1.09 1.09 -0.01 0.38 0.44 -0.07 -1.03 
    2.5074 -3.3677 3.3677 -0.0544 3.8717 2.6262 -0.5173 -3.1462 




Panel B. The signal is normalized to zero.           
  
 
Q demanded # of bids 
bid 
price 
discount STD Skewness Kurtosis 
  
UC(20) 18.45 4.54 -1.43 1.43 1.58 0.47 2.43 
  
  
14.7283 -5.7955 5.7955 12.9701 5.6337 15.5670 
  
          
UC(7) 6.91 2.67 0.19 -0.19 0.96 -0.10 1.96 
  
  
14.7197 0.5712 -0.5712 9.1798 -1.1049 37.9894 
  
          
C(7) 6.94 3.68 -0.35 0.35 1.59 0.09 1.99 
  
  
24.7919 -1.7063 1.7063 10.3842 1.7397 33.2091 
  
          
UC(7)-C(7) 
 
-1.01 0.54 -0.54 -0.63 -0.19 -0.04 
  
  
-4.3047 1.3879 -1.3879 -3.3957 -1.8253 -0.4431 
  
          
UC(20)-C(7) 
 
0.86 -1.08 1.08 -0.01 0.38 0.44 
  




Table 5: Regression results 
      
Equation1: Bid Price= a0 + a1Constrained + a2 Average signal + error 
  
Each bidder is an observation and N= 74 (32 bidders in UC treatment and 42 bidders in C treatments). 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
  
Intercept -1.41 0.24 -5.81 0.00 
  
Constrained 1.06 0.32 3.28 0.00 
  





     
No. Obs 74 
     
       
Equation2: Market Clearing Price= b0 + b1Constrained + b2 Average Signal + b3 Experience + error 
One auction is one observation and N=210 (112 UC auctions and 98 C auctions). 
  
Regression with clustered robust 
    
  Coefficients 
Robust Standard 
Error 
t Stat P-value 
  
Intercept 0.86 0.31 2.78 0.02 
  
Constrained -1.15 0.31 -3.76 0.00 
  
Average signal 1.14 0.07 15.64 0.00 
  





     
No. Obs 210 




Table 6: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
Panel A. HH index 
  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 Mean STD 
UC1 0.51 0.39 1.00 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.32 0.70 0.70 1.00 0.38 0.80 0.55 1.00 0.63 0.24 
UC2 0.53 0.41 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.59 0.43 0.57 0.87 0.82 0.91 0.50 0.66 0.22 
UC3 0.34 0.38 0.69 0.35 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.43 0.52 0.39 0.35 0.54 0.91 0.47 0.16 
UC4 0.56 0.76 0.30 0.78 0.82 1.00 0.41 0.58 0.65 0.53 0.91 0.55 1.00 0.56 0.67 0.21 
UC5 0.56 0.58 0.51 0.44 0.82 0.57 0.52 0.83 0.73 0.64 1.00 0.52 0.40 0.57 0.62 0.17 
UC6 0.62 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.31 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.38 0.40 0.56 0.56 0.47 0.08 
UC7 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.64 0.38 0.53 0.50 0.29 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.42 1.00 0.61 0.50 0.17 
UC8 0.39 0.50 0.63 0.50 0.29 0.37 0.50 0.46 0.56 0.72 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.11 
Mean 0.48 0.48 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.43 0.54 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.54 0.70 0.65 0.57 0.17 
STD 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.18   
                 C1 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.02 
C2 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.03 
C3 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.04 
C4 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.02 
C5 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.34 0.21 0.29 0.28 0.03 
C6 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.22 0.29 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.03 
C7 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.02 
Mean 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.03 




Panel B. Normalized HH index 
  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 Mean STD 
UC1 0.35 0.19 1.00 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.10 0.59 0.59 1.00 0.17 0.73 0.40 1.00 0.51 0.32 
UC2 0.38 0.21 0.19 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.34 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.83 0.76 0.87 0.33 0.55 0.29 
UC3 0.12 0.17 0.59 0.13 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.36 0.19 0.14 0.39 0.87 0.30 0.21 
UC4 0.42 0.68 0.06 0.71 0.76 1.00 0.21 0.44 0.53 0.38 0.87 0.39 1.00 0.41 0.56 0.28 
UC5 0.41 0.44 0.34 0.25 0.75 0.43 0.36 0.77 0.65 0.52 1.00 0.36 0.20 0.43 0.49 0.22 
UC6 0.49 0.25 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.23 0.07 0.22 0.32 0.41 0.17 0.20 0.41 0.41 0.30 0.11 
UC7 0.13 0.19 0.33 0.53 0.17 0.38 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.23 1.00 0.49 0.34 0.23 
UC8 0.18 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.06 0.16 0.33 0.28 0.41 0.63 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.34 0.15 
Mean 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.25 0.39 0.42 0.50 0.48 0.39 0.60 0.53 0.42 0.23 
STD 0.14 0.18 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.11 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.36 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.24   
                 C1 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.03 
C2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.03 
C3 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.05 
C4 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.02 
C5 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.04 
C6 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.04 
C7 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.02 
Mean 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.03 




Table 7: The relationship between the MCP and the bid price 
 
Panel A. UC treatment 
 
  
Rank Quantity-weighted bid price t-stat 
1 (highest) 1.48 7.99 
2 -1.58 -7.67 
3 -2.99 -13.31 
4 (lowest) -4.68 -13.71 
Market Clearing Price 0.83   
   Panel B. C treatment 
 
  
Rank Quantity-weighted bid price t-stat 
1 (highest) 3.17 15.49 
2 0.58 2.33 
3 -1.49 -6.86 
4 -2.39 -11.38 
5 -3.64 -11.87 
6 (lowest) -4.92 -9.66 





Figure 1: Auction distribution by the number of bidders who submitted price-quantity pairs 




















Figure 2: Demand curve 
        Note: The demand is at bidder's auction level. The true asset value is normalized to zero. 



















Figure 3: Bids distribution for average bidder in one auction 
NOTE: This figure shows the quantity demanded distribution at each bidding price level for both UC and C 
treatments. We include UC (7 units) for comparison purpose. The true asset value is zero. The percentage of 
quantity demanded at a certain price level is calculated by obtaining each bidder's mean auction quantity demanded 
at that price level, then dividing the mean auction quantity demanded by mean auction total quantity demanded), and 
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Figure 5: Distribution of auctions by the relationship between the market clearing price 


































































ESSAY 2: MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS WITH NONCOMPETITIVE 
BIDDING: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
           Auction is an important selling mechanism in the competitive markets where market 
participants hold diverse information about the intrinsic value of the auctioned items. In the 
financial market, auction has become a prevalent procedure for government debt issuance. 
However, it is rarely used in the equity Initial Public Offering (IPO) market where the estimation 
of the intrinsic value is more difficult. The auction approach has been tested in many countries in 
the 1980s, but it was gradually replaced by the bookbuilding and fixed price offer methods. 
Currently auctioned IPOs can be found only in a few countries and in none of these countries 
auction has become the dominant procedure.  
           The academic literature has advanced arguments for the potential reasons why auction is 
unpopular in the IPO market. Ausubel (2002) contributes the unpopularity of the auction to the 
pressure from investment banks to use bookbuilding since the profits from using bookbuilding is 
enormous, which is around 7 percent of the issue proceeds. Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) and 
Sherman (2005) provide different view. They show that auctions were abandoned long before the 
bookbuilding was introduced from the United States and it was even replaced by the fixed price 
offer in which the fees could be even lower. They argue that auction is particularly vulnerable to 
two serious problems in an IPO setting: the winner’s curse and the free riding problem. The 
winner’s curse problem applies when the value of the auctioned item is the same to all the 
bidders but bidders hold differential information about the intrinsic value. Theoretically the 
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winner’s curse problem can be overcome by shading bids, but bidders usually find it more 
difficult to adequately adjust the winner’s curse when the number of participants in the auction is 
unpredictable. Therefore, the winner’s curse deters the participation of investors. Among the 
potential participants, retail investors face the strongest winner curse because they are 
uninformed due to no resources to gather information. The second problem – the free rider 
problem arises because the standard IPO auction does not reward those who costly gather 
information or truly reveal information. Some investors, especially retail investors, have 
incentives to free ride by submitting extremely high bids as a bidding strategy to get shares 
without paying information acquisition cost. Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2008) study the 
19 U.S. IPOs completed by WR Hambrecht +Co through OpenIPO auction mechanism and find 
that retail investors are the major body of free riders.  
           The auction literature shows that mechanism design matters. Since the traditional IPO 
auction is vulnerable to two major problems, a natural question arises: can the inherent 
drawbacks be overcome by design modification which improves the performance of the auction 
by encouraging more participation, enforcing competitive results, promoting accurate pricing?  
           In seek of how to overcome the two problems that confront the standard IPO auction, we 
find that the U.S treasury has the practice of using a noncompetitive bidding mechanism to 
attract retail investors to participate. This noncompetitive bidding mechanism ensures less 
sophisticated and budget-constrained retail investors to acquire a certain amount of shares at the 
market price, which creates an opportunity for retail investors to “free ride” in spite of their 
information disadvantage. In the IPO market, the information gathering process is more costly 
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and the winner’s curse that investors face is much stronger than in the Treasury auction. 
Therefore, we predict that adding a noncompetitive bidding mechanism will affect the entry and 
bidding decisions of market participants, especially those unsophisticated retail investors. 
Allowing them to submit noncompetitive bids can reduce the winner’s curse and their incentives 
to free ride because they can now “free ride” by submitting market order. As a result, the 
investor base will broaden. In addition, the auction price is expected to be more accurate since 
competitive bids contain less noise when most of the uninformed retail bidders do not participate 
in the competitive bidding.   
           So far, no empirical work has been done to examine the role of the noncompetitive 
mechanism yet. No existing equity IPO models have incorporated this mechanism. Back and 
Zender’s (1993) Treasury auction model shows that the equilibrium stop-out price is 
monotonically increasing with noncompetitive demand, but this model is built on a lot of 
assumptions. Therefore, due to the lack of equilibrium models, we use laboratory experiments to 
examine the impact of incorporating a noncompetitive bidding option on auction results and 
bidding behaviors. Laboratory auction markets are a useful tool for understanding relative 
performance because they permit the controlled manipulation of the rules and procedures that 
constitute an auction mechanism. We also exploit the laboratory setting in order to control 
information sets, and to allow strategic dimensions. 
           Our experiment design includes two treatments: NC treatment (a uniform-price auction 
with noncompetitive bidding option) and C treatment (a standard uniform-price auction where all 
bids are competitive). Important features of the bidding environment include endogenous entry, 
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costly information acquisition, and bidders with different bidding capacity. We impose two 
bidder types in the experiment: large bidder and small bidder. This design is motivated by the 
observation that in the financial markets there are two types of investors:  retail investors and 
institutional investors. They differ in their size and bidding capacity. Retail investors are usually 
informally disadvantaged. In the experiment, the bidder type is exogenously determined. Once 
knowing his bidder type, each bidder then can make decisions on whether or not to participate, 
whether or not to purchase information, and how to submit bids. These bidding features simulate 
the real world IPO market and allow us to investigate how bidders make decisions in different 
market mechanism. 
           In our experiment, we restrict the auction pricing rule to be uniform rather than 
discriminatory, because in the United States the SEC prohibits issuers from selling shares to 
investors at different prices. A large body of theoretical work [for example, Vickery (1961), 
Friedman (1960), and Milgrom (2004)] suggests uniform pricing rules reduce the winner’s curse 
in the common value auction and encourage competition. We also employ pro rata rationing rule 
rather than the traditional rationing rule that gives allocation priority to the bids above the stop-
out price. Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) and Damianov (2005) show that rationing of all bids at 
and above the stop-out price can reduce underpricing in a uniform-price auction. This pro rata 
rationing rule is used in French IPO auction (see Derrien and Womack (2003)). 
           The main insight of this paper is that the major problems that confront the traditional IPO 
auction can be mitigated by improving the mechanism design. This research compliments recent 
work that studies alternative IPO auction mechanisms. For example, Ausubel (2004) proposes an 
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ascending multi-unit auction. Manelli, Sefton, and Wilner (2006) experimentally compare the 
Ausubel ascending auction with the Vickrey auction and show that the revenue generated in the 
Ausubel auctions are higher than the Vickrey auction in a common value setting.  
           Our main results are as follows. We find that the auction incorporated with a 
noncompetitive bidding option provides better performance with higher revenue, and lower 
pricing volatility and lower price error than the standard auction. In a costly information 
acquisition setting, we find significant underpricing in both treatments, but underpricing is less 
severe in the NC treatment. The noncompetitive bidding option significantly increase small 
investors’ participation rate and allocation, and reduces small bidders’ incentives to free ride by 
submitting extremely high bids. Bidding is more conservative in the NC treatment. However, the 
force of reduced supply on increasing the market clearing price is much stronger than the force 
of lowered bidding aggressiveness on reducing the market clearing price. As a result, the market 
clearing price in the NC treatment is higher. In both treatments, large bidders earn significantly 
higher profits than small bidders. Information purchase increases large bidder’s profit but 
reduces small bidder’s profit. The pricing accuracy is significantly related to the treatment and 
the number of information purchase. 
           The plan of the paper is as follows.  In section II we review the relevant literatures.  In 
section III we explain the experimental design, in section IV we discuss our results, in session V 




2.2 Literature Review 
         An auction with noncompetitive bidding system has been used in the U.S Treasury auctions. 
According to the Joint Report on the Government Securities Market (1992), the Treasury permits 
noncompetitive bidding in order to make it easier for smaller, less sophisticated bidders to 
participate. Theoretical IPO literature (Bennouri and Falconieri (2006) and Malakhov (2007)) 
have shown that increasing the participation of uninformed bidders generates more revenues to 
the issuer because it lowers the informational rent paid to the informed bidders. The 
noncompetitive bidding mechanism provides an opportunity for small investors to “free ride” by 
submitting noncompetitive bids and receiving shares at the market price, which reduces the 
winner’s curse they face and mitigate the free ride problem. Theoretical study of the 
noncompetitive bidding in a common value auction includes Back and Zender (1993). Their 
Treasury auction model shows the equilibrium stop-out price increases monotonically with the 
random noncompetitive demand.  The noncompetitive demand reduces the supply but also 
creates an uncertainty on the competitive supply. The expected stop-out price in a setting when 
there is uncertainty in the supply is higher than in a fixed supply setting. In a private paradigm, 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1996) models a multi-unit auction with noncompetitive sales with 
symmetric information. His model shows that at equilibrium, some buy noncompetitively while 
others bid in the auction, and the seller benefits from allowing noncompetitive sales. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2006) study a procure procedure which involves a hybrid 
mechanism which combines an English auction with noncompetitive contracts. Their 
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experimental study indicates that the hybrid mechanisms increase competition through removing 
some supply from the auction market.  
          In the mechanism design, we employ a uniform pricing rule. There are practical and 
theoretical reasons. According to the regulation of the U.S Securities and Exchanges Committee, 
investors should pay the same price for the new issued shares. Vickrey (1961) states that an 
auction should be structured so that the price paid by the player is as independent of his bids as 
possible, which will encourage competition. Milgrom (2004, pg 256) explains the uniform 
auction is frequently adopted in practice because it reduces price risk. Friedman (1960) claims 
that a uniform-price auction reduces the effect of the winner’s curse problem therefore 
encouraging competitive bidding. Sade, Schnitzlein, and Zender (2006a) find in a laboratory 
experiment that uniform pricing auction in a multi-unit common value setting generates higher 
revenues than does a discriminatory auction.  Bennouri and Falconieri (2006) show that the 
optimal IPO auction is a uniform-price auction. 
          Although a uniform pricing auction can enforce competition, the seminal paper by Wilson 
(1979), extended by Back and Zender (1993) shows that there are often multiple equilibria when 
a uniform-price auction is employed. These multi-unit auction models are built on multiple 
assumptions. Recent studies [Kremer and Nyborg (2004a, b), Sade, Schnitzlein, and Zender 
(2006a,b), Back and Zender (2001), and Damianov (2005)] have investigated whether the 
underpricing equilibria still hold if some assumptions are relaxed or some reasonable features are 
considered. These examinations includes changing demand functions from continuous to 
discrete, changing the rationing rule, considering bidder characteristics, and introducing 
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endogenous supply. All these studies show that the set of underpricing equilibria can be 
eliminated or reduced. Kremer and Nyborg (2004b)
 
argue that when bidders are allowed to 
submit discrete demand schedules or when there exist a minimal price tick and a minimal 
quantity multiple, underpricing can be reduced or even eliminated. Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) 
study the role of a rationing rule and show that rationing of all bids at and above the stop-out 
price leads to better outcomes for the seller in a uniform-price auction. Sade, Schnitzlein, and 
Zender (2006b) find that asymmetry in bidders’ capacity constraints plays an important role in 
inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit common value auctions. 
Sade, Schnitzlein, and Zender (2006a) demonstrate that in their experimental setting, bidders do 
not play the standard collusive-seeming strategies in the uniform-price auction. These results 
imply that collusion may not be a serious problem in the IPO market since investors in the new 
issuance markets are asymmetric in many aspects such as bidding capacities. The endogenous 
supply or uncertainty of supply will also reduce the set of underpricing equilibria [see Back and 
Zender (2001) and Damianov (2005)]. Damianov (2005) finds that endogenous supply with a pro 
rata rationing rule eliminates underpricing in the uniform-price auction. In our study, to limit the 
degree of underpricing, we adopt the pro rata rationing and build asymmetric bidding capacity 
into the auction mechanism.  The result of these studies suggests that a well designed multi-unit 




2.3 Experiment Design and Procedure 
2.3.1 Experimental Design Overview 
          Each experiment session consists of a series of periods in which 30 shares of stock are sold 
to 8 potential investors. There are 4 small investors and 4 large investors. In each period, each 
subject is randomly assigned as either large investor or small investor. A large investor can bid 
for up to 15 shares while a small investor can bid for up to 3 shares. This design is motivated by 
the observation that in the equity IPO market there are typically two groups of investors: 
institutional investors, who are better informed of the firm value and retail investors who are 
relatively uninformed. Typically, the two groups would also face different budget constraints so 
their bidding capacity differs. Before each auction begins, each bidder receives his bidder type. 
He then makes an entry decision. If he decides not to participate, he will receive L$1 
nonparticipation payment, which represents the return of investing in the risk free asset while 
giving up the bidding opportunity. For those who participate in the bidding, they have an option 
to purchase information about the true asset value. We include this feature in the experiment 
since gathering costly information about the fundamental value of the firm is a key characteristic 
of the equity IPO market. Once a bidder purchases information, he will receive a signal, which 
narrows the intrinsic value within the range of L$3 above or below the true value. The 
information cost is L$3.  
          We conduct experiments under two treatments. The first treatment is NC treatment (a 
uniform-price auction with noncompetitive bidding option). The second treatment is C treatment 
(a standard uniform-price auction, where only competitive bids are allowed). In the C treatment, 
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each participant submits only competitive bids while in the NC treatment, each participant is 
allowed to submit both noncompetitive and competitive bids. In the NC treatment, we impose 
restrictions on both the noncompetitive supply and the individual noncompetitive demand. The 
noncompetitive supply is 10 shares and the individual noncompetitive demand cannot exceed 3 
shares. We impose restrictions on noncompetitive supply because it is necessary to maintain a 
large pool of competitive bids to determine a price. If the noncompetitive supply is set too high, 
the price will be distorted since it only represents a very small proportion of market demand. If 
the noncompetitive supply is set too low, it will eliminate the role of the noncompetitive bidding. 
In the experiment, the supply available for the competitive bidders is not disclosed. This design 
is motivated by the research work of Back and Zender (2001) and Damianov (2005), who 
suggest that the uncertainty of the supply in the multi-unit auction will benefit the issuer.  In both 
treatments, the competitive bidding is conducted in a common value uniform-pricing auction 
where the intrinsic value is randomly selected from the interval of [L$12, L$28]. The distribution 
of the true value is common knowledge. The true value is unknown to all the bidders before 
auction begins and is revealed to all the bidders when the auction is completed. Once all the 
bidders finish submitting bids, software will determine whether the auction is successful or not; 
if market demand exceeds market supply, auction is successful. Then the software will calculate 
the market clearing price and allocate shares to the winning bidders. If market demand is less 
than market supply, auction fails and no shares will be distributed. 
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          Next, we discuss the details about how the market clearing price and the allocation is 
determined when the auction is successful. Following is the notation we use for the explanation 
of the allocation rule. 
p  stop-out price (market clearing price) 
n  the number of participants 
NC
id  bidder i’s noncompetitive demand 
C
id  bidder i’s cumulative competitive demand at stop-out price p  
NCD  market noncompetitive demand 
CD  market cumulative competitive demand at stop-out price p  
NC
iq  bidder i’s noncompetitive allocation 
C
iq  bidder i’s competitive allocation 
iq  bidder i’s total allocation 
  nonparticipation payment 
c  information cost 
          If the realized total noncompetitive demand ( NCD ) is equal or less than 10, the 
noncompetitive allocation for each bidder is the exact number of shares he submits ( NCid ). If 
NCD is greater than 10 shares, we will allocate the 10 shares to the winning bidders by pro rata 























When the total noncompetitive demand is greater than 10, the competitive supply is 20. When 
the total noncompetitive demand is less than or equal to 10, the competitive supply will be the 
difference of the total supply 30 and the total noncompetitive demand NCD . The stop-out price p
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is the highest price at which the market cumulative competitive demand equals or exceeds the 
total competitive supply. The market cumulative competitive demand at stop-out price p is
CD , 









). Bidder i ’s 






























Bidder i ’s total allocation in the NC treatment is the sum of noncompetitive allocation and 







































In the C treatment, bidder i ’s total allocation iq equals to
C






following table summarizes the allocation rules for a successful auction. 
 NC treatment C treatment 
 10NCD  10NCD   
Bidder i’s total 
















































2.3.2 Parameter Values and Variable Distributions 
          In our experiment, the monetary unit employed is the laboratory dollar (L$). To convert 
laboratory dollars to $US, the exchange rate is 0.04. Each bidder starts with the same initial cash 
balance of L$500. At the end of experiment, each subject receives an additional random payment 
ranging from $US1 to $US5. The random additional payment is designed to enhance 
experimental control when bidders have low balances. 
          There are three draws of the true values for three levels of subject experience. Bidder type 
and information structure are held constant. The private information is randomly selected from 
the integer range [-3, +3]. The signal value is the true value plus the private information.  Each 
bidder’s role as small bidder or large bidder is randomly assigned, conditional on that there are 4 
small bidders and 4 large bidders in each auction and in each session each subject is assigned as 
small bidder in 9 auctions and as large bidder in 9 auctions. There are 18 auctions for each 
session. 
2.3.3 Subjects and Procedures 
          We conducted a total of 14 sessions, with 7 sessions for each treatment. Each session 
consists of 18 auctions, with a cohort of 8 subjects. The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). In May, June, and October of 2009, we 
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recruited graduate and undergraduate students who had previous auction experiment experience 
at the University of Central Florida. The majority of the subjects were undergraduates of the 
College of Business Administration. Subjects’ level of experience includes inexperienced, 
experienced, and twice-experienced. In the “inexperienced” session, the subjects were first time 
participants. In the “experienced” session, the subjects participated in the experiment for the 
second time. In the “twice-experienced” session, the subjects were participating for the third time.   
          At the beginning of each session, subjects were given written instructions. The instructions 
explained the auction rules, the basis on which cash payments would be made, and included the 
bidding interface that introduce the subjects to the software used to conduct the experiment. The 
experimenter read the instructions to the subjects, and subjects were then given the opportunity 
to ask questions. Each subject was then assigned to a computer terminal. After each auction 
finishes, each subject learns the market clearing price, the true value, his allocation, his profit, 
and his cash balance. The interface stores historical auction results. Each auction is independent, 
with the exception of cash balances. The profit (loss) is carried over from period to period. Over 
the course of experiment, subjects are not allowed to communicate with each other. 
2.4 Experimental Results 
          We examine the experimental results focusing on the following outcomes: participation 




2.4.1 Basic Statistics 
          Table 8 presents basic statistics about auction results for both treatments. To simplify the 
data analysis, we normalize the true value in each auction to zero. Therefore, the market clearing 
price after shifting the true value to zero actually indicates the deviation of the market clearing 
price from the true value. In both treatments, the market clearing price is significantly lower than 
the true asset value, indicating significant underpricing occurs. The degree of underpricing in the 
NC treatment (L$0.69) is less severe than in the C treatment (L$1.21). The nonparametric test 
shows that the difference of underpricing in both treatments is significant at 10 percent level. We 
use the standard deviation of market clearing prices to proxy for price volatility and find that the 
price in the NC treatment is relatively less volatile. However, the difference of the price volatility 
across treatments is not statistically significant. Another performance indicator we examine is 
price error, which is defined as the difference of the market clearing price and the true asset 
value, in absolute value. We find that the price error in the NC treatment is significantly lower 
(p=0.07), indicating more accurate pricing. These three performance indicators suggest that the 
auction with noncompetitive bidding option performs better than the standard auction with 
significantly higher market clearing price and lower price error.  
2.4.2 Participation Rate and Information Purchase Behavior 
          Table 9 presents statistics about the participation rate. The participation rate of small (large) 
bidders is the number of small (large) bidders who choose to participate in the auction divided by 
the total number of small (large) bidders, which is 4 in each auction. In both treatments, the 
participation rate of large bidders is significantly higher than that of small bidders. In the NC 
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treatment, the participation rate of large bidders is 98% and 85% for small bidders. In the C 
treatment, the participation rate is 95% for the large bidders and only 74% for the small bidders. 
Comparing both treatments, we find that the small bidders in the NC treatment have significantly 
higher participation rate than in the C treatment. The difference in the mean of the participation 
rate of small bidders is 11% (t=3.03). Comparing large bidders’ participation rate in both 
treatments, we find there is no significant difference. This result shows that the incorporation of 
a noncompetitive bidding option increases small bidders’ incentives to participate.  
          Table 10 shows the data for information acquisition. The subject pool excludes the non-
participants. The purchase rate of potential participants is the number of bidders who purchased 
information divided by the total number of participants. We find that in both treatments, large 
bidders are more likely to purchase information than small bidders. In the NC treatment, the 
information purchase rate for large bidders is 83%, but only 7% for small bidders. In the C 
treatment, the rate for large bidders is 74% and 14% for small bidders. The difference is 
statistically significant at 1% level. Comparing the information acquisition behavior across 
treatments, we find small bidders in the NC treatment are less willing to purchase information 
than in the C treatment. It seems that the noncompetitive bidding option increases small bidders’ 
incentives to free ride by submitting noncompetitive bids with no need to purchase costly 
information. In contrast, large bidders in the NC treatment are more willing to purchase 
information than in the C treatment.  
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2.4.3 Noncompetitive Bidding 
          Table 11 displays the demand data. We first examine individual bidder’s total demand. In 
the C treatment, on average, a small bidder demands 2.98 shares while a large bidder demands 
14.78 shares. In the NC treatment, an average small bidder demands 2.99 shares while an 
average large bidder demands 14.39 shares. There is no significant difference in the total demand 
across treatments for both groups.  
          We next examine the noncompetitive demand for the NC treatment. The total demand is 
64.49 in each auction, with 14% from noncompetitive demand, and 86% from competitive 
demand. Small bidders submit more noncompetitive bids than competitive bids. On average, 58% 
of a small bidder’s total demand is noncompetitive demand, which suggests that with the option 
of noncompetitive bidding, small bidders prefer to submit noncompetitive bids to secure shares.  
The large bidders submit both noncompetitive and competitive bids.  But their noncompetitive 
demand (1.28) is even lower than that of small bidders (1.73). 
2.4.4 Competitive Bidding 
          Next we examine how bidders submit competitive bids. We follow the moment analysis by 
Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2005). The quantity-weighted bid price (the first moment) and 
the standard deviation (the second moment) are shown in Table 12. The weighted bid price 
shows the bidding aggressiveness while the standard deviation indicates the degree of bids 




represents the demand schedule submitted by bidder i in auction j, where 
m is the number of bids bidder i submitted. ijp is the quantity-weighted bid price for bidder i in 
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The result shows that large bidders in the NC treatment bid relatively less aggressively 
than in the C treatment, though the mean difference is not statistically significant. The weighted 
bid price for the large bidder in the NC treatment is -L$1.62 and -L$1.24 in the C treatment. We 
further split the large bidders into two groups: those who purchased information and those who 
did not purchase information. We found the large bidders with information purchase shaded their 
bids significantly more than those who did not purchase information.  In the NC treatment, the 
average weighted bid price for large bidders with information purchase is -L$1.79 while -L$0.66 
for those without information purchase. In the C treatment, the weighted bid price for those who 
purchased information is -L$1.44 while -L$0.43 for those who did not purchase information. The 
explanation of this result is that information cost is one important element for bidders to build 
their bidding strategies.  
          
Now we examine the bidding strategies of small bidders. We split small bidders in the NC 
treatment into two groups: those whose competitive bids are positive and those whose 
competitive bids are zero. For those who did not submit competitive bids, we cannot calculate 
his weighted bid price. Table 12 Panel B shows that in the NC treatment the average weighted 
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bid price for small bidders with information purchase is -L$0.60 and -L$1.10 for those without 
information purchase. In Table 12 Panel D, the weighed bid price for small bidders with 
information purchase is -L$0.59 but L$4.48 for those who did not purchase information. The 
result shows that small bidders in the C treatment submit very high bids, especially for those who 
did not purchase information. This result is consistent with the empirical findings of Degeorge, 
Derrien and Womack (2008) that small bidders submit extremely high bids to free ride in the U.S. 
auctioned IPOs.  
          The standard deviation is an indicator of the dispersion of bids. The result shows large and 
small bidders who did not purchase information in the C treatment spread out more bids than 
those in the NC treatment. This indicates the bidding strategies of those bidders who face the 
strongest winner’s curse.
 
2.4.5 Market Clearing Price 
          In this section, we compare the market clearing price across the treatments. The mean 
market clearing prices are reported in Table 8. Figure 9 shows the distribution of auctions by the 
market clearing price. Figure 10 shows the distribution of auctions by the relationship between 
the market clearing price and the true value. Table 13 reflects regression results pertaining to 
determinants of the market clearing price and price error. 
          Table 8 reports the mean market clearing price. The result shows that the market clearing 
prices in both treatments are significantly lower than the true asset value. The degree of 
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underpricing is significantly lower in the NC treatment than in the C treatment. Figure 9 shows 
the distribution of auctions by the market clearing price. We find there are more auctions in both 
treatments with market clearing prices below the true asset values. The market clearing price in 
the C treatment is relatively more volatile than in the NC treatment since there are more auctions 
with extreme market clearing prices. Figure 10 displays the distribution of auctions by the 
relationship between the market clearing price and the true value. In the NC treatment, 28% of 
the auctions saw a market clearing price higher than the true value. In the C treatment, only 17% 
of the auctions have a market clearing price higher than the true value. There are more auctions 
in the C treatment (64%) than in the NC treatment (53%) in which the market clearing price is 
less than the true value. 
          Table 13 examines the determinants of market clearing price and price error. We find that 
the market clearing price is significantly related to the dummy variable NC treatment and the 
average signal, indicating the market clearing price in the NC treatment is significantly higher 
than in the C treatment and the level of market clearing price is increasing with the level of 
average signal.  We use two variables to measure the price error. The first is the absolute value of 
the difference of the market clearing price and the true asset value. The second variable is the 
absolute value of the difference of the market clearing price and the average signal. The 
independent variables are NC treatment (1 for NC treatment and 0 for C treatment), signal 
accuracy, the number of signals, inexperienced (1 for inexperienced session and 0 for 
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experienced and twice-experienced sessions), and experienced (1 for experienced session and 0 
for inexperienced and twice-experienced sessions). There are two measurements for signal 
accuracy. Signal accuracy 1 is the difference of the mean of signals purchased by all bidders and 
the true value, in absolute value. Signal accuracy 2 is the standard deviation of all the signals 
purchased by bidders. The regression result shows that price error is significantly related to the 
number of signals. When there are more signals in the auction, the price is more accurate and 
price error is significantly lower. When we use the absolute value of the difference of the market 
clearing price and the average signal to measure the pricing error, we find that the coefficient for 
the dummy variable NC treatment is significant at the 1% level, indicating the price error in the 
NC treatment is significantly lower than in the C treatment. 
 
2.4.6 Profit and Allocation 
          Bidder’s profits display the same pattern for both treatments. Large bidders earn higher 
profits than small bidders. The auction profit for an average large bidder in the NC treatment is 
L$2.04, and L$1.13 for an average small bidder. In the C treatment, an average large bidder 
earns L$6.29 while an average small bidder earns L$1.20. In both treatments, large bidders who 
purchased information earn significantly higher profits (L$3.03 in the NC treatment and L$8.15 
in the C treatment) than those who did not purchase information (-L$0.81 in the NC treatment 
and L$3.03 in the C treatment). In contrast, small bidders who did not purchase information earn 
higher profits than those who purchased information. The average uninformed small bidder’s 
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profit is L$1.34 in the NC Treatment and L$1.57 in the C treatment. However, for small bidders 
who purchased information, the average profit is -L$2.09 in the NC treatment and -L$1.74 in the 
C treatment. Therefore, it is difficult for small bidders to cover the information cost. Across the 
treatment, large bidders in the standard auction earn significantly higher profits than those large 
bidders in the auction with noncompetitive bidding option. This is due to the lower market 
clearing price in the C treatment. 
          Figure 11 shows the distribution of bidders by profit or loss. Bidders in the C treatment are 
more likely to make money. The percentage of small bidders with a profit is 75% in the C 
treatment while 21% in the NC treatment. The percentage of large bidders with profit in the C 
treatment is 83% but 69% in the NC treatment. 
          Table 12 also reports the allocation information. The pattern is very clear. A large bidder 
receives significantly more shares than a small bidder since the large bidder has a higher bidding 
capacity. We further find that the incorporation of the noncompetitive bidding option greatly 
improves a small bidder’s allocation. An average small bidder gets 2.06 shares in the NC 
treatment but 1.78 shares in the C treatment. The difference is statistically significant (t=2.53). 
The large bidders in the NC treatment receive significantly fewer shares than in the C treatment. 
An average large bidder receives 5.99 shares in the NC treatment and 6.55 shares in the C 
treatment. Including a noncompetitive bidding option helps small bidders to win more shares and 
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therefore reduce large bidders’ allocation. On average, a small bidder’s allocation in the NC 
treatment is significantly higher than in the C treatment. 
          Table 14 reports the total allocation data. The result shows that the noncompetitive bidding 
mechanism removes 29% of the supply from the total supply. On average, 9 shares are allocated 
to the noncompetitive bidders and 21 shares are allocated to the competitive bidders. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
          In the previous analysis we find that bidders in the C treatment bid more aggressively than 
in the NC treatment, especially for small bidders. This indicates that small bidders in the 
standard auction are more likely to free ride by submitting high bids. With the noncompetitive 
bidding option, small bidders do not need to submit extremely high competitive bids to secure 
shares. Rather, they can just submit noncompetitive bids to ensure an allocation. 
          Then an interesting question arises: Why do both large and small bidders in the NC 
treatment bid less aggressively than in the C treatment but the market clearing price in the NC is 
higher than in the C treatment? The reason lies in the mechanism effect of the noncompetitive 
demand on the market clearing price. In our experiment, the market clearing price is determined 
by the highest price at which the cumulative demand exceeds or is equal to the total supply. 
When the total supply is reduced by 30% due to the noncompetitive demand, the market clearing 
price is indirectly increased. The force of reducing supply on increasing the market clearing price 
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is much stronger than the force of lowered bidding aggressiveness on reducing the market 




           This paper uses economic experiments to evaluate design features of a uniform-price 
auction in a setting relevant for the issuance of new securities. The experimental design features 
include: different bidding capacities, endogenous entry, costly information acquisition, and 
uncertainty in the intrinsic value. We find significant underpricing in both treatments but the 
underpricing in the NC treatment is less severe. Incorporation of a noncompetitive bidding 
option generates better auction results, including higher market clearing price, lower price 
volatility, and lower pricing error. Including the noncompetitive bidding option also attracts 
more small investors to participate and they receive significantly more shares. By examining the 
bidding data, we find that including the noncompetitive bidding option allows small bidders to 
secure shares by submitting noncompetitive bids rather than submitting extremely high bids in a 
standard auction. Therefore, it reduces the incentives of small investors to free ride and makes 
the price less volatile. Including the noncompetitive bidding option reduces the bidding 
aggressiveness, but the effect of reducing the market clearing price is largely offset by the effect 
of increasing the market clearing price through removing some supply by noncompetitive 
bidding. The impact of the force of removing supply on the market clearing price is much 
stronger than the force of reducing bidding aggressiveness. Therefore, the market clearing price 
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is higher in the NC treatment. By examining the profit and allocation data, we find that in both 
treatments, large bidders earn higher profits and receive significantly more shares than small 
bidders. Information acquisition has an impact on the bidder’s profit. It increases large bidders’ 
profits but reduces small bidders’ profits. Information acquisition also affects information 
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Table 8: Experimental sessions and summary statistics 
The price error is the difference of the market clearing price and the true value, in absolute value. The t-statistics significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively. The nonparametric test is two-sample Fisher-Pitman permutation test for equality of means. The 
p-value is two-tailed p-value. 
Date Treatment Session Experience # of bidders # of auctions Market clearing price 
(True value is normalized to 0) 
Price 
error 
Mean Max Min Std 
5/19/2009 NC 1 Inexperienced 8 18 -0.22 2 -4 2.10 1.78 
5/20/2009 NC 2 Inexperienced 8 18 -0.89 1 -5 1.45 1.22 
5/27/2009 NC 3 Experienced 8 18 -0.89 3 -3 1.91 1.78 
5/28/2009 NC 4 Experienced 8 18 -0.28 2 -5 2.02 1.50 
6/2/2009 NC 5 Twice-experienced 8 18 -0.83 1 -3 1.10 1.06 
6/15/2009 NC 6 Inexperienced 8 18 -1.67 3 -6 2.28 2.22 
10/6/2009 NC 7 Inexperienced 8 18 -0.06 3 -3 1.89 1.50 
mean       8 18 -0.69 2.14 -4.14 1.82 1.58 
t-stat           -3.30 6.30 -9.02 11.81 10.78 
            ** *** *** *** *** 
5/21/2009 C 1 Inexperienced 8 18 -1.22 3 -5 1.90 1.78 
5/29/2009 C 2 Inexperienced 8 18 -1.94 2 -5 1.92 2.29 
6/1/2009 C 3 Experienced 8 18 -0.61 4 -7 2.87 2.28 
6/3/2009 C 4 Experienced 8 18 -0.72 6 -4 2.11 1.50 
6/4/2009 C 5 Twice-experienced 8 18 -1.61 1 -5 1.50 1.72 
6/16/2009 C 6 Inexperienced 8 18 -1.17 5 -4 2.41 2.06 
10/13/2009 C 7 Inexperienced 8 18 -1.17 4 -6 2.55 2.06 
mean       8 18 -1.21 3.57 -5.14 2.18 1.95 
t-stat           -6.86 5.50 -12.73 12.49 17.36 
            *** *** *** *** *** 
Difference           0.52 -1.43 1.00 -0.36 -0.38 
t-stat 
    
  1.88 -1.95 1.63 -1.54 -2.03 
  
    
  * *     * 
Nonparametric test (p-value)         0.08 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.07 
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Table 9: Participation rate 
The participation rate of small (large) bidders is the number of small (large) subjects who choose to participate divided by the total number of small 









Small  Large Total Small  Large Total Small  Large Total 
NC1 3.7 3.8 7.6 0.3 0.2 0.4 93% 96% 94%     
NC2 3.2 4.0 7.2 0.8 0.0 0.8 81% 100% 90%     
NC3 3.4 4.0 7.4 0.6 0.0 0.6 86% 100% 93%     
NC4 3.6 4.0 7.6 0.4 0.0 0.4 89% 100% 94%     
NC5 3.7 4.0 7.7 0.3 0.0 0.3 92% 100% 96%     
NC6 2.7 3.6 6.3 1.3 0.4 1.7 68% 90% 79%     
NC7 3.4 4.0 7.4 0.6 0.0 0.6 85% 100% 92%     
Mean 3.4 3.9 7.3 0.6 0.1 0.7 85% 98% 91% -13% -3.79 
                      *** 
C1 3.1 3.7 6.7 0.9 0.3 1.3 76% 92% 84%     
C2 2.8 3.4 6.2 1.2 0.6 1.8 71% 85% 78%     
C3 2.9 4.0 6.9 1.1 0.0 1.1 72% 100% 86%     
C4 2.8 4.0 6.8 1.2 0.0 1.2 69% 100% 85%     
C5 2.8 4.0 6.8 1.2 0.0 1.2 71% 100% 85%     
C6 3.3 3.7 6.9 0.7 0.3 1.1 82% 92% 87%     
C7 3.0 3.9 6.9 1.0 0.1 1.1 75% 99% 87%     
Mean 3.0 3.8 6.8 1.0 0.2 1.2 74% 95% 85% -21% -7.66 
                    
 
*** 
Difference(NC-C) 0.4 0.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 11% 3% 7%     
t-stat 3.03 1.04 2.79 -3.03 -1.04 -2.79 3.03 1.04 2.79     
  ***   *** ***   *** ***   ***     
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Table 10: Information purchase rate 
For each auction, we count the number of information buyers for small (large) bidder group. Then we average these numbers 
across 18 auctions to get the mean of the number of small (large) buyers for that particular session.  The purchase rate for the 
small (large) bidder group in each session is the average number of small (large) buyers by the average number of small (large) 
participants. The t-statistics significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively. 
Session 




Small  Large Total Small  Large Total Small  Large Total 
NC1 0.7 3.2 3.9 3.7 3.8 7.6 17.9% 84.1% 51.5%     
NC2 0.2 3.5 3.7 3.2 4.0 7.2 5.2% 87.5% 50.8%     
NC3 0.2 3.0 3.2 3.4 4.0 7.4 6.5% 75.0% 43.3%     
NC4 0.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 4.0 7.6 4.7% 83.3% 46.3%     
NC5 0.0 3.4 3.4 3.7 4.0 7.7 0.0% 84.7% 44.2%     
NC6 0.1 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.6 6.3 4.1% 69.2% 41.2%     
NC7 0.3 3.7 4.0 3.4 4.0 7.4 8.2% 93.1% 54.1%     
Mean 0.2 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.9 7.3 6.8% 82.6% 47.4% -76%*** -20.70 
C1 0.6 3.1 3.7 3.1 3.7 6.7 20.0% 84.8% 55.4%     
C2 0.6 1.9 2.6 2.8 3.4 6.2 21.6% 57.4% 41.1%     
C3 0.1 2.6 2.6 2.9 4.0 6.9 1.9% 63.9% 37.9%     
C4 0.2 2.8 3.1 2.8 4.0 6.8 8.0% 70.8% 45.1%     
C5 0.0 4.0 4.0 2.8 4.0 6.8 0.0% 100.0% 58.5%     
C6 1.1 2.8 3.9 3.3 3.7 6.9 33.9% 77.3% 56.8%     
C7 0.2 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.9 6.9 7.4% 63.4% 39.2%     
Mean 0.4 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.8 6.8 13.7% 74.2% 47.8% -60%*** -8.36 
Difference 
(NC-C) -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 -6.9% 8.4% -0.3%     
t-stat -1.03 1.46 0.79 3.03 1.04 2.79 -1.30 1.34 -0.10     
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Table 11: Demand 
Each auction is an observation. NC demand - noncompetitive demand; C demand - competitive demand. 
  Average demand by small bidder in one auction Average demand by large bidder in one auction Total demand in one auction 


























NC1 1.73 1.27 3.00 58% 42% 1.25 13.55 14.79 8% 92% 9.17 56.83 66.00 14% 86% 
NC2 2.07 0.93 3.00 69% 31% 1.69 12.79 14.49 12% 88% 9.94 54.17 64.11 16% 84% 
NC3 1.75 1.25 3.00 58% 42% 1.49 12.96 14.44 10% 90% 9.39 56.22 65.61 14% 86% 
NC4 1.64 1.34 2.98 55% 45% 1.33 12.46 13.79 10% 90% 9.00 54.61 63.61 14% 86% 
NC5 1.61 1.39 3.00 54% 46% 1.86 12.93 14.79 13% 87% 9.44 56.89 66.33 14% 86% 
NC6 1.74 1.23 2.96 59% 41% 0.44 12.97 13.40 3% 97% 6.17 50.28 56.44 11% 89% 
NC7 1.56 1.40 2.96 53% 47% 0.90 14.10 15.00 6% 94% 8.22 61.11 69.33 12% 88% 
Mean 1.73 1.26 2.99 58% 42% 1.28 13.11 14.39 9% 91% 8.76 55.73 64.49 14% 86% 
                                
C1     3.00         15.00         64.17     
C2     2.94   
  
  14.60   
  
  58.17     
C3     3.00   
  
  14.42   
  
  66.33     
C4     2.94   
  
  14.97   
  
  68.06     
C5     3.00   
  
  14.99   
  
  68.44     
C6     2.98   
  
  14.57   
  
  63.22     
C7     3.00   
  
  14.92   
  
  67.83     
Mean     2.98         14.78         65.17     
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Table 12: Bidding data 
The analyzed bidding data excludes the failed auction (C2 Aution3). In order to calculate the weighted bid price and standard deviation of the bid price, we exclude those 
bidders who submitted zero bids. Each auction is an observation. (***: 1% significance level; **: 5% significance level; *: 10% significance level.) 
  





# of observations Weighted  
bid price 






# of price-quantity  
pairs 
NC1 Large Yes 18 -1.95 1.36 0.61 5.90 1.30 13.51 14.81 3.94 
NC2 Large Yes 18 -1.35 1.05 3.35 6.50 1.81 13.15 14.96 3.90 
NC3 Large Yes 18 -2.81 1.78 4.97 5.53 1.51 13.01 14.53 3.95 
NC4 Large Yes 18 -1.12 1.30 -0.06 6.11 1.19 13.51 14.70 3.59 
NC5 Large Yes 18 -2.30 1.95 2.02 5.96 1.75 13.25 15.00 3.78 
NC6 Large Yes 18 -1.73 1.51 11.60 7.09 0.10 14.44 14.53 5.14 
NC7 Large Yes 18 -1.27 0.98 -1.31 5.56 0.96 14.04 15.00 3.37 
Mean 
   
-1.79 1.42 3.03 6.09 1.23 13.56 14.79 3.95 
            NC1 Large No 10 0.02 1.06 -5.87 6.36 1.15 13.35 14.50 4.15 
NC2 Large No 9 -2.77 1.20 1.18 3.07 1.00 10.22 11.22 3.67 
NC3 Large No 15 -1.56 1.20 -2.01 6.34 1.43 12.57 14.00 4.67 
NC4 Large No 9 2.91 4.18 0.97 6.17 1.83 11.28 13.11 2.17 
NC5 Large No 11 -3.22 8.10 4.53 5.05 2.73 12.27 15.00 2.27 
NC6 Large No 13 -2.01 2.19 5.70 5.91 1.14 10.04 11.18 4.97 
NC7 Large No 5 1.99 2.66 -10.19 7.57 0.00 15.00 15.00 6.00 
Mean 
   
-0.66 2.94 -0.81 5.78 1.33 12.10 13.43 3.99 
            NC1 Large Yes + No 18 -1.67 1.28 -0.30 5.92 1.25 13.55 14.79 3.93 
NC2 Large Yes + No 18 -1.53 1.08 2.80 6.01 1.69 12.79 14.49 3.89 
NC3 Large Yes + No 18 -2.57 1.64 3.06 5.77 1.49 12.96 14.44 4.15 
NC4 Large Yes + No 18 -0.52 1.69 -0.66 5.97 1.30 13.19 14.49 3.38 
NC5 Large Yes + No 18 -2.39 2.85 2.30 5.79 1.88 13.13 15.00 3.50 
NC6 Large Yes + No 18 -1.66 1.70 9.07 6.72 0.44 12.97 13.40 5.18 
NC7 Large Yes + No 18 -1.01 1.12 -1.98 5.73 0.90 14.10 15.00 3.57 




Panel B: NC treatment-small bidder 
Treatment Information  
Purchase 








Total demand # of price-quantity  
pairs 
NC1 Yes NC=3 3     -4.00 2.82 3.00 0.00 3.00   
NC2 Yes NC=3 1 
  
-3.00 2.73 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 NC3 Yes NC=3 1 
  
3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 NC7 Yes NC=3 1 
  
-3.00 2.50 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 Mean 
     
-1.75 2.76 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 
            NC1 Yes NC=0,1,2 8 -1.34 0.03 -2.58 1.07 0.31 2.69 3.00 1.06 
NC2 Yes NC=0,1,2 2 1.75 0.25 -4.27 2.49 1.50 1.50 3.00 1.50 
NC3 Yes NC=0,1,2 3 -1.00 0.27 -0.06 2.52 0.00 3.00 3.00 1.67 
NC4 Yes NC=0,1,2 3 -1.33 0.54 0.03 0.97 0.00 3.00 3.00 2.33 
NC6 Yes NC=0,1,2 2 -0.50 0.00 -3.00 2.31 1.50 1.50 3.00 1.00 
NC7 Yes NC=0,1,2 3 -1.17 0.44 -2.38 0.62 0.33 2.67 3.00 2.00 
Mean 
   
-0.60 0.26 -2.04 1.66 0.61 2.39 3.00 1.59 
            NC1 Yes NC=0,1,2,3 9 
  
-3.42 1.41 0.89 2.11 3.00 
 NC2 Yes NC=0,1,2,3 3 
  
-3.85 2.57 2.00 1.00 3.00 
 NC3 Yes NC=0,1,2,3 3 
  
0.33 2.71 0.50 2.50 3.00 
 NC4 Yes NC=0,1,2,3 3 
  
0.03 0.97 0.00 3.00 3.00 
 NC6 Yes NC=0,1,2,3 2 
  
-3.00 2.31 1.50 1.50 3.00 
 NC7 Yes NC=0,1,2,3 5 
  
-2.63 0.87 0.80 1.60 2.40 
 Mean 
     
-2.09 1.81 0.95 1.95 2.90 
 
            NC1 No NC=3 16 
  
0.07 2.54 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 NC2 No NC=3 16 
  
2.28 2.30 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 NC3 No NC=3 15 
  
1.77 2.39 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 NC4 No NC=3 16 
  
1.26 2.52 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 NC5 No NC=3 18 
  
1.58 2.27 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 NC6 No NC=3 11 
  
5.73 3.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 NC7 No NC=3 18 
  
0.13 2.84 3.00 0.00 3.00 
 Mean 
     






Panel B: NC treatment-small bidder 
Treatment Information  
Purchase 








Total demand # of price-quantity  
pairs 
NC1 No NC=0,1,2 16 1.17 0.64 0.21 1.78 0.71 2.29 3.00 1.95 
NC2 No NC=0,1,2 15 -1.62 0.41 0.85 1.33 0.87 2.13 3.00 1.90 
NC3 No NC=0,1,2 16 -1.24 1.17 0.89 1.55 0.76 2.24 3.00 2.15 
NC4 No NC=0,1,2 16 7.32 0.19 0.53 1.75 0.11 2.83 2.94 1.44 
NC5 No NC=0,1,2 18 2.32 0.94 1.41 1.70 0.45 2.55 3.00 1.75 
NC6 No NC=0,1,2 16 -2.53 0.55 2.97 1.88 1.06 1.90 2.96 1.60 
NC7 No NC=0,1,2 16 2.25 0.82 -0.13 1.53 0.24 2.76 3.00 1.64 
Mean 
   
1.10 0.67 0.96 1.65 0.60 2.38 2.99 1.78 
            NC1 No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
0.31 2.17 1.85 1.15 3.00 
 NC2 No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
1.60 1.84 2.07 0.93 3.00 
 NC3 No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
1.27 1.99 1.75 1.25 3.00 
 NC4 No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
0.82 2.16 1.71 1.27 2.98 
 NC5 No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
1.50 1.95 1.61 1.39 3.00 
 NC6 No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
4.03 2.32 1.74 1.22 2.96 
 NC7 No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
-0.16 2.17 1.64 1.36 3.00 
 Mean 
     
1.34 2.09 1.77 1.22 2.99 
 
            NC1 Yes + No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
-0.34 2.11 1.73 1.27 3.00 
 NC2 Yes + No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
1.42 1.87 2.07 0.93 3.00 
 NC3 Yes + No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
1.22 2.05 1.75 1.25 3.00 
 NC4 Yes + No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
0.64 2.08 1.64 1.34 2.98 
 NC5 Yes + No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
1.50 1.95 1.61 1.39 3.00 
 NC6 Yes + No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
3.93 2.32 1.74 1.23 2.96 
 NC7 Yes + No NC=0,1,2,3 18 
  
-0.46 2.07 1.56 1.40 2.96 
 Mean           1.13 2.06 1.73 1.26 2.99   
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# of observations Weighted  
bid price 
Std Profit Allocation Total  
demand 
# of price-quantity  
pairs 
C1 Large Yes 18 -1.48 0.63 9.32 7.24 15.00 2.68 
C2 Large Yes 16 -1.48 1.82 12.99 8.39 14.81 3.12 
C3 Large Yes 18 -0.71 0.92 5.67 6.87 15.00 2.60 
C4 Large Yes 18 -0.47 2.22 3.56 6.94 15.00 3.26 
C5 Large Yes 18 -1.36 0.78 7.65 6.53 14.99 3.11 
C6 Large Yes 18 -1.90 1.21 8.01 7.02 14.68 3.61 
C7 Large Yes 18 -2.70 2.40 9.88 6.26 14.92 4.34 
Mean 
   
-1.44 1.43 8.15 7.04 14.91 3.25 
          C1 Large No 8 0.20 3.69 1.69 7.48 15.00 5.44 
C2 Large No 14 -2.05 7.89 9.25 5.33 14.91 2.80 
C3 Large No 17 2.84 4.82 -2.11 5.99 13.51 4.75 
C4 Large No 15 -2.92 8.00 3.19 4.19 14.87 3.40 
C6 Large No 11 1.28 2.55 5.17 5.82 13.82 4.86 
C7 Large No 16 -1.93 2.97 1.08 5.49 14.81 5.16 
Mean 
   
-0.43 4.99 3.04 5.72 14.49 4.40 
          C1 Large Yes + No 18 -1.31 1.03 7.29 7.09 15.00 3.01 
C2 Large Yes + No 17 -1.81 4.32 11.53 7.08 14.87 2.95 
C3 Large Yes + No 18 0.41 2.29 2.61 6.15 14.42 3.49 
C4 Large Yes + No 18 -1.06 3.90 2.91 6.13 14.97 3.29 
C5 Large Yes + No 18 -1.36 0.78 7.65 6.53 14.99 3.11 
C6 Large Yes + No 18 -1.20 1.52 6.13 6.83 14.57 3.95 
C7 
  
18 -2.36 2.62 5.94 6.07 14.92 4.60 









# of observations Weighted  
bid price 
Std Profit Allocation Total  
demand 
# of price-quantity  
pairs 
C1 Small Yes 9 -1.72 0.41 -1.41 1.11 3.00 1.94 
C2 Small Yes 9 1.52 1.65 0.96 1.58 3.00 1.50 
C3 Small Yes 1 1.33 0.47 -5.31 2.31 3.00 2.00 
C4 Small Yes 4 -2.42 0.12 -2.32 0.68 3.00 1.25 
C6 Small Yes 14 -2.23 0.79 -0.58 1.09 3.00 1.90 
C7 Small Yes 4 0.00 1.77 -1.76 1.92 3.00 1.25 
Mean 
   
-0.59 0.87 -1.74 1.45 3.00 1.64 
          C1 Small No 18 3.34 1.79 0.87 1.53 3.00 1.66 
C2 Small No 17 6.90 2.53 4.42 2.08 2.90 1.37 
C3 Small No 18 6.36 1.88 -0.25 1.82 3.00 1.47 
C4 Small No 18 9.34 0.56 1.12 2.15 3.00 1.12 
C5 Small No 18 0.58 1.92 1.72 1.45 3.00 2.14 
C6 Small No 18 1.64 1.66 1.44 1.84 2.97 1.96 
C7 Small No 18 3.21 1.67 1.70 2.09 3.00 2.12 
Mean 
   
4.48 1.72 1.57 1.85 2.98 1.69 
          C1 Small Yes + No 18 2.02 1.68 0.22 1.43 3.00 1.75 
C2 Small Yes + No 18 5.79 2.35 4.00 2.01 2.93 1.41 
C3 Small Yes + No 18 6.13 1.81 -0.31 1.82 3.00 1.48 
C4 Small Yes + No 18 8.39 0.50 0.50 1.97 3.00 1.13 
C5 Small Yes + No 18 0.58 1.92 1.72 1.45 3.00 2.14 
C6 Small Yes + No 18 0.56 1.26 0.75 1.66 2.98 1.94 
C7 Small Yes + No 18 3.03 1.71 1.51 2.08 3.00 2.07 




Panel F: Comparison 






Std Profit Allocation Total  
demand 
# of price-quantity  
pairs 
NC-C Large Yes + No -0.38 -0.73 -4.25 -0.57 -0.30 0.46 
t-stat 
  
-0.90 -1.29 -2.37 -2.66 -1.35 1.42 
     
*** *** 
  
         NC-C Large Yes -0.35 -0.01 -5.13 -0.94 -0.12 0.71 
t-stat 
  
-0.95 -0.03 -2.56 -2.85 -1.33 2.29 




         NC-C Large No -0.23 -2.04 -3.86 0.06 -1.06 -0.42 
t-stat 
  
-0.18 -1.49 -1.45 0.09 -1.55 -0.61 
         
         NC-C Small Yes + No 
  
-0.07 0.29 0.00 
 t-stat 
    
-0.09 2.53 
  
      
*** 
  
         NC-C Small Yes 
  
-0.35 0.36 
  t-stat 
    
-0.31 0.86 
  
         NC-C Small No 
  
-0.23 0.23 
  t-stat 
    
-0.32 1.92 
  
         NC-C Small Yes -0.01 -0.61 -0.31 0.21 0.00 -0.05 
t-stat 
  
-0.01 -2.08 -0.28 0.50 
 
-0.19 
    
* 
    
         NC-C Small No -3.39 -1.04 -0.61 -0.21 0.00 0.08 
t-stat 
  
-1.95 -4.09 -0.93 -1.63 
 
0.48 
      * ***         
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Table 13: Determinants of market clearing price and price error 
        The dependent variables are market clearing price, |market clearing price-true value|, and |market clearing price-average 
signal|. |market clearing price-true value| and |market clearing price-average signal| measure the pricing error. The NC treatment 
is a dummy variable with 1 for the NC treatment and 0 for the C treatment. Average signal is the mean of the signal values 
purchased by all bidders. Signal accuracy 1 is the difference of the mean of signals purchased by all bidders and true value, in 
absolute value. Signal accuracy 2 is the standard deviation of all the signals purchased by bidders. Inexperienced is a dummy 
variable with 0 for experienced and super-experienced session and 1 for inexperienced session.  Experienced is a dummy variable 






|market clearing price - true value| 
|market clearing price - 
average signal| 
Intercept -1.37*** 2.93*** 3.24*** 3.22*** 3.01*** 
t-static -3.95 6.41 7.25 7.61 7.26 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
NC treatment 0.49** -0.28 -0.26 -0.50*** -0.51*** 
t-static 2.01 -1.59 -1.49 -3.12 -3.12 
p-value 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.00 
            
Average signal 0.68***         
t-static 5.51         
p-value 0.00         
            
Signal accuracy1   0.09   -0.18   
t-static   0.65   -1.34   
p-value   0.51   0.18   
            
Signal accuracy2     -0.10   0.00 
t-static     -1.07   0.00 
p-value     0.29   1.00 
            
# of signals    -0.40*** -0.42 -0.40*** -0.38*** 
t-static   -4.16 -4.21 -4.57 -4.18 
p-value   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Inexperienced 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.24 
t-static 0.42 1.36 1.37 1.07 1.02 
p-value 0.68 0.18 0.17 0.29 0.31 
            
Experienced 0.58 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.24 
t-static 1.47 0.44 0.43 0.85 0.90 
p-value 0.14 0.66 0.67 0.40 0.37 
            
R-square 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.12 
# of observations 251 251 246 251 246 
88 
 
Table 14: Allocation 
              
  
Average allocation by small bidder in one 
auction 




































NC1 1.47 0.63 2.11 70% 30% 1.02 4.90 5.92 17% 83% 9.17 20.83 30.00 31% 69% 
NC2 1.56 0.31 1.87 83% 17% 1.25 4.76 6.01 21% 79% 9.94 20.06 30.00 33% 67% 
NC3 1.41 0.64 2.05 69% 31% 1.17 4.60 5.77 20% 80% 9.39 20.61 30.00 31% 69% 
NC4  1.32 0.75 2.08 64% 36% 1.07 4.58 5.65 19% 81% 9.00 21.00 30.00 30% 70% 
NC5 1.16 0.79 1.95 59% 41% 1.32 4.39 5.71 23% 77% 9.44 20.56 30.00 31% 69% 
NC6  1.74 0.59 2.32 75% 25% 0.44 6.28 6.72 6% 94% 6.17 23.83 30.00 21% 79% 
NC7 1.45 0.62 2.07 70% 30% 0.83 4.90 5.73 15% 85% 8.22 21.78 30.00 27% 73% 
Mean 1.44 0.62 2.06 70% 30% 1.01 4.92 5.93 17% 83% 8.76 21.24 30.00 29% 71% 
                                
C1     1.43         7.09         30.00     
C2     2.01   
  
  6.07   
  
  30.00     
C3      1.82   
  
  6.15   
  
  30.00     
C4      1.95   
  
  6.13   
  
  30.00     
C5     1.45   
  
  6.53   
  
  30.00     
C6     1.66   
  
  6.83   
  
  30.00     
C7     2.08   
  
  6.07   
  
  30.00     
Mean     1.77         6.41         30.00     




    
-2.28 
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